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ABSTRACT
THE POLITICS OF PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT:
A LEGISLATIVE CASE STUDY

May 1988
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Dakota
M.S., Texas Women's University
Ph.D., University of Massachusetts

Directed by:

Professor George Sulzner

Following Cormiittee hearings,
a

system of prospective payment

signed
to

into

law on April

in

February 1983, Congress adopted

for the Medicare

20, 1983.

This

is

a

program that was

case study that attempts

explain why an innovative reimbursement mechanism that drastically

altered Medicare fiscal management was so swiftly enacted.
of the events

provides

a

using John Kingdon's work as

rationale for the policy outcome.

appeared to be facing

a

fiscal

conceptual

framework

The federal

government

crisis with diminishing revenues

rising expenditures of which
hospitalizations.

a

Analysis

a

and

major component was Medicare

At the same time, the Social Security System was on

the verge of bankruptcy because the Hospital Insurance Trust Fund had
defaulted on

a

12 million dollar loan.

vii

Richard Schweiker, Secretary of Health
and Human Services
proposed

a

prospective payment system based on diagnosis
related

groupings.

The model

selected by Schweiker had proven its

effectiveness when implemented on

team

in

a

statewide basis and

the Office of Research and Demonstration

Services had developed

a

strategy for national

in

research

a

Health and Human

implementation.

Upon request of the Congress, Schweiker submitted

report that

a

outlined the prospective payment system to the
Senate Finance and

House Ways and Means Committees.

functioning as

a

Congress, special

Prior to its submittal, Schweiker

policy entrepreneur

,

informed and canvassed the

interests, and the general public.

Then following

Committee hearings during which no adamant opposition was voiced, the

respective committees voted to attach the proposal to the Social
Security Amendments thereby insuring its adoption.

endorsed the proposal

for various reasons.

Special

interests

The hospital

industry

supported it because it rewarded efficient operation of hospitals by

allowing them to retain the difference between the price set by the
government and the actual cost of care.

Senior citizens believed that

without the proposal, the entire Social Security System might

be

dismantled.
All

of the effects of the policy are undetermined to date but it

appears that prospective payment may be containing in-patient Medicare

hospital

expenditures while increasing outlays for other treatment

modalities.

Until

the actual

impacts are known, final

v

i i i

conclusions

regarding the meri ts

of prospective payment are
premature.

Although

the system may have flaws, major
changes are unlikely to occur

near future because,

,

as

noted

in

in

the

this case, dramatic changes in
health

policy are the cul mination of events
which gradually evolve over
decades
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CHAPTER

I

INTRODUCTION

The

following

is

case study of Title VI of Public Law
98-21

a

(P.L. 98-21). This piece of legislation
altered the reimbursement of

the federal Medicare program and changed
American health care policy.

Prior to the bill's enactment,

hospitals were reimbursed

retrospecti vely for the reasonable costs which they
incurred
providing care to Medicare recipients.

Title VI

of P.L.

in

98-21

prospectively set reimbursement rates based on the discharge
diagnosis
of

the patient receiving treatment.

received by the hospital

is

The specific reimbur semen

established according to

system called Diagnosis Related Groups (DRGs
In

classification

a

)

response to the passage of the Tax Equity and Fiscal

Responsibility Act (TEFRA)

in

August 1982, Richard Schweiker,

Secretary and Health and Human Services

(HHS)

submitted

a

prospective

payment strategy to the Senate Finance and House Ways and Means

Committees

in

December of that year.

Congressional

proposal were held in February 1983 and following

chambers

in March,

April 20, 1983.

hearings on the
a

vote

the prospective payment system was signed

A national

hospitals for care provided

in

both

into law

prospective payment system to reimburse
to Medicare recipients was

October 1983.

1

implemented

in

2

P.L. 98-21 was selected for
study because of the relative
ease
with which this innovative policy
was enacted.
The question to be

addressed

is

why it passed so quickly when

a

myriad of other health

policy proposals, with far less impact
on health care, remain forever
in

what Theodore Marmor refers to as

a

constant state of indecision.

1

PURPOSE OF THE STUDY

This dissertation is an attempt to explain
the process which
lead to the enactment of prospective
payment.

dissertation

related to three aspects of health care policy

is

United States.

The first is that health care delivery is

growing industry with

a

is

a

the

in

rapidly

a

significant level of government involvement.

The second is that the health

manner which

The importance of the

care industry functions

product of its market design.

in

a

The third

unique
is

that

there had been little research done which provides decision
makers

with an explanation of what influences health policy outcomes.
The health care industry has grown over the past 50 years.

provision of health care was seen
until

the end of World War

more of

a

II.

as

a

substantially private matter

Since then, health care has become

public responsibility.

Especially since the passage of

Medicare/Medicaid in 1965, there has been substantial

government expenditures for health care.
government

is

The

increase

in

Currently, the federal

the largest single purchaser of health care in the

United States.

Federal health care expenditures have more than

tripled since 1965 and in 1982 accounted for 10.5% of the Gross
National Product.^ Other indicators of growing government involvement

3

in

health care include the fact
that

in

1976 the public sector

provided 42% of health outlays
compared to 26% in 1965 and
13 % in
1930
By 1982, federal expenditures
for Medicare reimbursement
were

/

$33.4 billion with an anticipated
increase to $50.4 billion by
1985. 5
In 1985 Medicare expenditures
were limited to $40 billion
because of
the enactment of

a

prospective payment system. 6

Increased government involvement
health care policy need to be studied.

is

Another reason is that the

health delivery system does not operate
both

one reason the politics of

in

a

free market; there

controlled access to the industry and there

third-party reimbursement.
been identified as

costs.

7

It

a

is

is

dominance of

The use of third-party reimbursement has

major underlying cause of rising health care

believed that hospitals respond to increased insurance

is

coverage by changing the style of care provided. 8 This indicates
that
increased reimbursement for care insures that
providers will provide

more complex style of care.

Parkinson

s

Law of medical

What begins to emerge is

care:

a

a

form of

"Standards of practice will

eventually rise to absorb the dollars available."

9

These

characteristics question the propriety of applying other public policy
models (e.g., those drawn from public transportation

)

in

the realm of

health care.

Although the need for research has been established, the^e

enormous gap

in

this area.

Most political

politics of health state the need for
outcome of proposed health policies.

a

is

an

scientists studying the
means of elucidating the

The few explanations offered to

4

date, are specific to the
policy studied and are unable
to explain the
rapid adoption and implementation
of prospective payment.

Marmor states the desirability
of political analysis of
health
policy and the need for instruments
to predict and hopefully
control
the outcomes of proposed health
policy.™
He points out that political

science efforts have been more
descriptive than explanatory or
predictive, but suggests that the
greatest contributions political

science can make is

in

explanatory paradigms
settings.

11

the creation of "analytic models
and
that can be applied in

a

variety of health

Because of the increase of government
involvement

in

health care delivery and the rising budgetary
costs for health, policy

makers need

a

means of analyzing a proposed policy to
determine

in

advance its potential legislative outcome.

METHOD AND DESIGN

The methodology to be used

is

a

case study approach involving an

indepth investigation into the process that led to the passage
of P.L.

98-21, prospective reimbursement for hospitals.

The case study

methodology has the advantage of providing highly detailed data for

one

example and can help one understand the process

outcome was reached.

also valuable

The information obtained from

a

exploratory research where the goal

in

by which

an

case study is
is

to develop

generalizations which can be subsequently examined in other studies.

The case study,

if

well

chosen, provides an example of representati ve

processes, structures, and actions.

5

The

major disadvantages of

a

case study are the biases

introduced by the qualitative
nature of the data collected
and the

'imitation of
representative.

utility

single instance which may

a

Consequently,

case study approach may be
of limited

a

testing hypotheses, but

in

generating hypotheses where there

Data collection

the

in

is

it

is

the preferred approach to

little confirmed knowledge. 12

project included:

government documents relating to P.L.
98-21,
congressional hearing reports, and
for

implementation.

intimately involved

In
in

participants included:

may not be

or

(3)

review of

(1)

(2)

review of

review of regulations developed

addition, thirty interviews with

those

passage and implementation were conducted.
Key
(1)

Health and Human Services,

Richard Schweiker, former Secretary of
(2)

Carolyne Davis, Director of the Health

Care Finance Administration;
(3) Julian Pettingel and James VerTrees,
Office of Research and Development, Health Care
Finance Administration
(HCFA); (4) John D.

Thompson, Professor, Yale University; and

staff members at the HCFA who participated
proposal

and

in

(5)

the formulation of the

represented the Administration during the process of

policy adoption. Further, interviews with four selected
lobbyists were
held and

a

review of the position papers of various special

interest

groups directly affected by the policy was completed.

Included were

the American Hospital Association, the American Medical

Association,

the Federation of American Hospitals, Medical

Records Association,

Blue Cross and Blue Shield Association, National Task Force of Gray

Panthers, National Council of Senior Citizens, Medical Society

of New

6

Jersey, American Association
of Retired Persons, and
the Association
of American Medical

Colleges.

Ten members of Congress, who
worked to insure passage of
P.L. 9821, were also

interviewed.

Particular attention was given
to the

sponsors of the bill and their
health policy staff members.
latter included:

The

Sheila Burke from the Senate
Finance Committee,

Subcommittee on Health; Keith Kahn from
Senator David Durenberger

’s

Office; Paul Rettig, Professional
Staff of the House Committee on
Ways
and Means; and John Salmon, Chief
Council of House Cormittee on Ways
and Means. Selection of persons
interviewed was

based on records of

their testimony at hearings, correspondence
submitted to committee
members and referrals from interviewees.

The organizing design for the study draws
upon John Kingdon's
theory of public policy generation.

Kingdon states that when the

three factors of problems, policies, and politics
join together, there
is

coupling" which opens the "window of opportunity"
allowing

a

change to occur through the enactment of new policy. 13

According to Kingdon, problems are identified by systematic

indicators and focusing events.

An example is the systematic

evaluation of federal expenditures for Medicare that indicated

growth
will

in

outlays for the program.

not necessarily be

triggering event

addressed

in

a

rapid

Once a problem is

identified,

the political

arena unless

it
a

or crisis occurs which focuses attention of decision

makers on the problem.

Identification of

the adoption of the policy

in

a

response to

problem does not insure
a

crisis, but it removes

barriers that may have previously stifled enactment.

7

The second element

Kingdon's model emphasizes
phases of policy

in

formulation and the characteristics
of the policy which emerges.
PolKies are successfully formulated,

Kingdon asserts, when the policy

IS

the product

of

a

policy community activated by

policy

a

entrepreneur. ^

The national policy community,
Kingdon observes,

consists of

policy specialists drawn from executive
agencies and congressional

staff units, academicians, and analysts
for interest groups.
aggregates are united by

shared

a

interest in

These

a

field of policy and

tend to be familiar with one another's
work.

The policy conmunity

functions outside the formal political
environment, yet, within the

community, policies are formulated with
mil ieu

an

awareness of the political

15
.

An obstacle to efficient operation of

lack

of

a

policy community

communication among its members, which

often

"fragmentation" and may produce "disjointed policy" that

is

is

a

leads to
lacking

a

common orientation causing unintended impacts and agenda instability.

To avoid fragmentation, Kingdon prescribes open communicati on within
the policy community .

Policy communities, Kingdon relates, become involved

formulation most often

response to

in

individual who advocates

a

in

policy

policy entrepreneur or

specific policy.

willingly invest their resources
the policy arena.

a

in

Policy entrepreneurs

the pursuit of

a

future return

in

The incentives which motivate policy entrepreneurs

are promotion of personal

value, or interaction with

interests, promotion of
a

like-minded group.

a

philosophy or

8

The role of the policy
entrepreneur

community to formulate
in

of

mutual

a

a

is

to work with the policy

policy and collaborate with
experts resulting

enhancement of the credibility of
the policy

in

the eyes

legislators when the policy is
considered for adoption.

The final
task of the policy entrepreneur
is "softening up" the
general public,

specialized

interest groups, and

Softening up

the

key governmental

actors.

essentially an educational process
which through

is

informed exposure of the content of
policy can add to

its acceptance

upon enactment. 18

The work of the policy entrepreneur
would be futile, according
to Kingdon, unless the proposal

criteria.
(1)

is

the entrepreneur advocates meets three

The first is that it possesses technical
feasibility which

developed after delving into the details and
technicalities of

the proposal to eliminate inconsistencies,
of implementation,

and

(3)

less

attends to feasibility

specifies the actual mechanism by which the

solution can be put to practical use.
it contain

(2)

10

The second criteria

intact and survive the policy process.

a

proposal

efficient

with an

that

value acceptability so that the content will remain more or
Although Kingdon does not

specifically define value acceptance he suggests that

when

is

in

reflect mainstream thinking and

its design.

is

present

equitable and

The final criteria is that it be structured

anticipation of future contraints.

to survive the

is

it

The proposal must be able

inevitable budgetary constraints, which will

be

imposed

during adoption, and that unintended impacts are controlled through
the policies design. 20 If policy adheres to these guidelines, Kingdon

9

projects the emergence of

a

consensus that can be expanded
through the

use of coalition-building
techniques such as bandwagoning
and tipping.

The last component of Kingdon's
model focuses on policy
adoption

which he designates as the
political stream.

stream are influenced

by the national

Actions in the political

mood, organized interests, and

government officials.
K-ingdon

postulates each ingredient of his model

as

relatively

independent tributaries which eventually
flow together to form

political

mandate.

The convergence creates

offers the optimal chance of policy
enactment.

a

a

policy window, which
As Kingdon relates,

"...at some critical juncture the three streams
are joined, and the
greatest policy changes grow out of that coupling
of problem, policy
proposals, and politics." 21

Congressional hearings on prospective payment for Medicare
began
in

February 1983

in

the United States Senate and the United
States

House of Representatives.

By October of 1983,

an entirely

new

mechanism for Medicare reimbursement had been adopted and was
ready
for implementation.

This apparent speed

The avenue to success was paved by years

in

enactment

is

of activity on

misleading.

the problem

identification and policy formulation fronts and wading
political

stream.

The nine months of intensive involvement

reflects the opening of the window of opportunity for

a

in

in

the

1983

prospective

payment system for hospitalization which was creatively and

successfully entered.

Using Kingdon's approach, the following three

chapters probe the phases of the policy process.

Chapter

II

examines

the question of problem identification relative to prospective payment

10

of hospitalization costs.

contents of

a

Chapter III looks at the
development of the

prospective payment system.

Chapter

detailed maneuvers which led to
legislative enactment of
payment system.

follows the

IV
a

prospective

Chapter V attempts to relate what
implications this

case study might have for health
policy analysis

in

particular and

public policy in general.
A

necessary first step toward the goal

of

creating

a

comprehensive health care program for the
citizens of the United
States is the accumulation of better
information about how the policy

process can be leveraged to advantage.

modest start

in

that direction.

This dissertation represents a

Through increased understanding,

a

health care delivery system may emerge which
is not vulnerable to

external economic and political whims and provide
the key essentials
basic to acquired and sustaining a healthy and
productive populace.

11
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CHAPTER

II

THE PROBLEM

Development of Health Policy in the
United st.atpc
The focus

of

health policy

throughout the 20th Century.

in

the United States has shifted

Each new policy direction has been

response to the social, economic, and
political

a

influences of the day.

According to Paul Starr, this evolutionary
pattern can be neatly
divided into three periods.

chronologically

as

He labels

the periods of health policy

progressive, expansionary, and containment. 2 During

the progressive stage (1900-1920), proposed
policies focused on income

maintenance for

ill

or disabled

employees.

This shifted as the

country moved into the expansionary stage (1920-mid
1970) which
focused on providing access to health care regardless of
financial
status or geographic location.

The current stage focuses on control

of rapidly escalating health

care costs.

of health

2

Review of the development

policy, the proposed policy solutions, and the support

generated for endorsement of potential solutions
stream

in

in

the political

each stage and particularly in the expansionary and contain-

ment stages, helps explain the problem facing legislators when DRGs
were offered as

a

mechanism capable of controlling rising health care

costs.

13

14

The Progressive st.agp
The problem which reformers
of the progressive
stage addressed
was that of income
stabilization during illness.
Prior to the 20th
Century, workers were insured
through sickness funds
sponsored by

mutual

societies, unions, and employers

to provide cash benefits

case of illness to compensate
for lost wages.

in

Such programs had

dwindled by the turn of the century;
and after the passage of
insurance against industrial
accidents (workmen's compensation),
interest in health insurance (sickness
pay) developed.

3

Reformers who addressed the problem
were from outside the

government.

The group which took the initiative
to insure wage

compensation during illness was the American
Association for Labor

Legislation (AALL).

4

The AALL presented its case for sickness

insurance based on two objectives.

poverty caused by illness

by distributing individual wage losses
and

medical costs through insurance.

social

cost

First, they wanted to relieve

Second, they wanted to reduce the

of illness through medical

care and by creating monetary

incentives for disease prevention.^
As the Progressive Era ended

in

the 1920's, no policy had been

generated that would respond to the crisis of wage loss due to
illness.

The solution developed by the AALL was unable to rally

enough support to ever establish the plan as national

health policy.

Consequently, the period did not directly affect later health policy
eras.

What is noteworthy about the Progressive era is that,

although

unsuccessful, citizens groups and professional associations emerged
who thought the government should become involved

in

the issue.

15

Expansionary Stage
Policies developed and instituted

the Expansionary stage were

in

ultimately responsible for the
fiscal crisis facing the
98th Congress.
Review of the events of this
period is necessary to comprehend
the
subsequent need for controlling federal
health care expenditures.
There was very little activity
on health care issues in the
1920

and

s

early 1930 s.

The country was heading toward
unprecedented

prosperity after World War

The presidencies

I.

Coolidge symbolized "back to normalcy,"

of Harding and

and major health and welfare

policies were given little consideration
by either the public or

private sector.

Yet, the issue of health insurance did not
totally

dissipate.

The concept of health insurance was revived during
the New Deal
and following World War II.

medical

costs and unmet

The two major issues were:

"increasing

'needs'." The problem was that "the cost of

services were rising to the point that not only wage earners,
but also

people of 'moderate means', were finding them hard
result of this economic barrier,

to meet.

And

as

a

society was failing to meet

individual's health care needs." 7

The

increase

in

health

care costs originated during the

Progressive Period, but its impact was not actually felt until the

1920

'

s

.

The cost of both physician's services and hospitalization

increased, but especially the latter.

fees

came from two sources:

The increase

improvement

in

in

physician's

the quality of services

due to scientific advances; and increased monopoly power

due to

licensing restriction which, by the 1920's, gave physicians higher

16

returns on their investment
justifiable. 8 The rise

transformation

education than were, perhaps,

in

hospital costs was

in

of hospital

care.

Prior to 1870, hospitals
were

caretakers of the chronically ill

charities.

9

As hospitals

the result of the

that operated basically as

became centers for surgery and
acute

medical care, their construction and
operating costs soared.

As

hospital care became more common and
derived more income from
services, their charges grew.
An

informal

conference,

^

conference was held

1926 to discuss the social

the

1

a

in

Washington, O.C.

and economic aspects

in April

health care.

of

At

committee of five members who were either

physicians, public health professionals, or
economists was formed to

conduct studies regarding the social

and economic aspects of health

care. 11

This formal

the annual

meeting of the AMA

Participants
in

corrmittee presented

in

in

its

findings

in

conjunction with

Washington, D.C.

in

May 1927.

the conference, who had connections with individuals

private foundations, believed that the findings presented warranted

further study.

The result was the creation of the Committee on the

Cost of Medical Care (CCMC)

Odin Anderson,

consisting of

the committee

42

people.

"membership read like

According to
a

Who's Who in

Health Services Public Policy." 12

The

CCMC

planned five areas for intensive study:

incidence of disease and disability in

health care facilities,

(3)

the population,

(2)

(1)

existing

family expenditures for health care,

incomes of service providers, and (5)

the

(4)

plans for health services for

17

specific population groups.

Six private foundations
contributed

approximately $1 million for this
research, and nearly everyone
of
note in health care and social
sciences participated in the
ensuing
research.
The studies done by the CCMC
found that, "the need for
medical
care as defined by professional

standards was higher than the
rate of

utilization even among the highest
income group." 1 * The CCMC
estimated the social costs of medical
care at four percent of national

income.

Most advocates did not find that
figure excessive;

they believed people
receiving.

fact,

care than they were

This perception of a problem spawned
policy analyses based

on the premise that

resulting

needed more medical

in

in

an

there was an inadequate supply of health
care

inability to meet the "health needs of

a

nation." 15

The presumptions were that more health care
was necessary and the

government should be compelled to devote more resources
expansion of the health care delivery system.

16

In the

to

insure

introduction to

the CCMC final report, Chairman Ray L. Wilbur wrote, "More
money must
be spent for medical

can

be

care;

and this

is

practicable if the expenditures

budgeted and can be made through fixed periodic payments.

nl 3

The stance taken, requiring more expenditures to meet the health

needs of the nation, marks the shift of health policy from
distributing wage losses and medical

costs through

expansionary financing to facilitate access.

a

means of

insurance into

The chief concern became

increasing access to and consumption of health care rather than income
protecti on. 18

18

Nearly all public and private
programs of the era were
characterized by the desirability of
expanding medical services and
a
general willingness to accommodate
the interests of hospitals
and

doctors.

After World War II, the federal
government began to

subsidize hospital construction and
medical research with
principle objective of expanding medical
resources.

the

National health

insurance proposals reflected this
objective.

During the expansionary period, many
proposals were offered to
solve the problem of restricted access to
medical care.

On the whole,

proposals were directed toward solving the
problem of inaccessibility
of care due to rising

costs.

Recommendations for national health

programs were proposed by Presidents Roosevelt and
Truman; but neither

could rally enough support to insure the enactment
of any national
health pol icy.

Some of the early attempts at improving access to health
care
were made

in

1939 with the

introduction of Senate Bill

Wagner of New York, the Caper Bill
Eliot Bill

1941

(Senate Bill 489), the

1942 (House of Representatives Bill

in

Wagner-Dingel

in

1

Bill

in

1945 (Senate Bill

1920 by Senator

1606).

7354), and the

These bills were

substantially the same; the intent of each was to remove the financial

burden of illness from the people.

There was no direct change

existing health delivery system

any of these plans.

in

in

the

The major

issue which led to their demise was ideological —that is, endorsement
of the programs was

not forthcoming because most

organizations considered

it

individuals and

inappropriate for the government to use

19

payroll deduction and/or taxation
to finance health services
for
everyone.

There was not enough support
plan until

convened

the landslide elections in
in

1965

,

a

national

to enact any national

1964.

health care

When the 89th Congress

health care plan was a priority
for both

the Congress and the Administration.

The plan did not provide health

care to all Americans, but instead
covered only the indigent and the
elderly.

The coverage for the financially
needy was called Medicaid;

and for the elderly,

it was

called Medicare.

Medicare grew faster and

consumed more federal dollars than Medicaid.

Since Medicare was the

primary focus of attention during the transition
into
containment stage of health policy in the United
States,

the cost
it

is

the

topic of discussion here.

Once signed into law

on

July 30, 1965, Medicare became the

primary payer of health care for the elderly.
designed

in

The program was

conjunction with the Social Security System and became

known as Title XVIII of the Social Security Act.

into two major components.

Medicare was divided

The first was the basic health insurance

plan for hospitalization which

is

generally referred to as Plan

The other component of Medicare, referred to

as

Plan B, dealt with

reimbursement to physicians for care provided to the elderly.

prospective payment system (PPS) of Title

A.

The

VI of the 1983 Social

Security Amendments (SSA) only addressed reimbursement for Plan A,

consequently only the description of
to this

exposition.

it and

its

financing are relevant

20

Medicare
El

igibil ity

Those eligible for benefits
under this plan were persons

65

years of age or older, except
active or retired federal employees
who

were eligible for the federal health
benefits program, and unlawful
aliens or aliens who had not lived
in the United States

five consecutive years.
f ol

1

for at

least

An outline of the main components
of Plan A

ows.

Benefits

In-patient hospital costs for

up

to 90 days

per

illness with

deductibles of $40 for the first 60 days and
$10 per day for the
subsequent 30 days.

All

routine hospitalization charges were included

under the plan except for care provided

by

psychiatrists,

radiologists, anesthesiologists, and pathologists.

The only in-house

physician services which were covered were those offered by
residents
or

interns

in

approved teaching programs.

days and the limit of 60 days per

A lifetime

limit of 190

illness were set for psychiatric

care.
-

Post -hospi tal

care,

such as provided by

facility, was provided to patients following

three days or more with the patient incurring

a

skilled nursing

a

hospitalization of

$5

per day of the costs

after the first 20 days of care.
-

Out-patient diagnostic services were covered, with

$20

a

deductible, for all services provided by the same hospital during

a

20

21

day period,

After

20

days, Plan A covered 20
percent of the remaining

costs.
Up to

other than

100 home health

doctor following

a

were covered.

a

visits made by health care
providers
hospitalization of three days or
more

Payments would be made based on
"reasonable cost" of

the services.

Financing
Funds for the program were obtained through
payroll taxes of .35

percent in 1966;

percent
and

1976-79

in

thereafter.

percent in 1967-72;

.50

;

.70

percent

in

The taxable annual

.55

1980-86

percent
;

and

in

1973-75;

.60

.80 percent in 1987

earnings base for the health

insurance payroll tax was set at $6,000 effective January

There was no ceiling set on income tax deductions

1

,

1966.

for medical

expenses
It was

determined that general revenue would pay the coverage

cost of those who had not participated in the Railroad Retirement fund
or Social

Security.

All

moneys collected were to be placed

separate Hospital Insurance Trust Fund

in

in

a

the Treasury.

Administration

The Secretary of Health Education and Welfare was designated
the major admini strator of the plan.

An Advisory Council

as

was also

created to advise the Secretary on the administration of the plan.^

22

-Projected Costs of the
Medicare Program

The estimated cost of
Medicare in 1965 was,

according to the
House Ways and Means Committee
Report, “in long-range balance
with
contribution income."21 Payroll
tax increases were set
according to
the guidelines of Table
1, presented
below.

It was

increase would cover the major
portion of the costs

assumed that this

incurred by the

Medicare program, but not necessarily
all of them.
Medicare was quoted as
the barriers to health care.

an

enormous breakthrough

Stephen M.

in

overcoming

Young (Democrat-Ohi
o) clearly

stated, for example, "The measure
represents the greatest advance

social

in

legislation ever presented to the Senate." 23
The overall tenor

of the decision to have health
care

insurance provided for the elderly

was noted in President Johnson's
address at the signing of the bill

in

Independence, Missouri, with former President
Harry Truman, on July
30

,

1965

.

No longer will older Americans be denied
the healing
miracle of modern medicine.
No longer will illness crush
and destroy the savings that they have so
carefully put
away over a life time so that they might enjoy
dignity in
their later years.
No longer will young families see
their own incomes, and their hopes, eaten away
simply
because they are carrying out their deep moral obligation
to their parents, and to their uncles and their aunts.
And no longer will this nation refuse the hand of justice
to those who have given a life time of service and wisdom
and labor to the progress of this progressive country.^
For all

its innovation. Medicare did not drastically change the

health care delivery system.

The program maintained

the established

pattern of delivery of care and remuneration for services to hospitals
and physicians.

Because Medicare based reimbursement on the rate set

23
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by

the institution or
physician, the government
had relatively little
control over the outlays for
the program. 25

Medicare
era.

is

the culmination of the
expansionary health policy

Through the rest of the 60's
and during the early
70's, many

Other expansionary health policies
were proposed.

Although the

passage of other expansionary
health policies was rare, the
proposals
were driven by the same philosophy
that health care was a right
of all
individuals. 26 A recurring theme

attempt to develop

in

proposed health policy was the

national health insurance program
that would

a

provide health care not just to the
indigent and elderly, but also to
all citizens of the country.
A major proponent of such a
plan.
Senator Edward Kennedy (Democrat-Massachusetts)

establish such

a

proposed,

to no

but

program.

Several

,

worked tirelessly to

other variations of his theme were

avail. 27 Proposals for the expansion of

government subsidized health care failed because
the emphasis
the problem of access began to diminish as
federal

on

expenditures for

health began to rise. The background of the
movement to deal with
cost containment of hospitalization under Plan A of
Medicare will

be

the subject of analysis for the remainder of this chapter.

Cost Containment Stage

By the mid 70

1

s

,

the United States entered into

concern about health policy.

new phase of

Proposed policies began to reflect the

need to control

the ever-rising costs of health care.

for the shift in

focus is

Medicare program began

a

The necessity

indicated by the fiscal trends that the

to display.

A program that had been

initially

25

des

to provide a stable fiscal

base for the provision
of health

care to the elderly began
to grow beyond expectation.

Another factor which influenced
the movement from the
expansionary to cost containment
stage was

health care delivery system.

shift

a

power within the

According to Alford, hospital

administrators began to emerge as
institutional

care delivery system.

in

leaders

in

the health

Along with the increasing power
within health

care institutions, administrators
also became more influential

formulation of health policies.
group affected

the

in

The emergence of this new interest

shift in the focus of health policy
from one which

a

addressed the amount of care provided to
one which addressed the
economic efficiency of health care. 28

This change
who were involved

in
in

attitude also stenmed from the fact that those
the creation of Medicare did not anticipate
the

rate at which health care expenditures would
increase or the demographic changes

in

the country.

were enrolled in Medicare.
million.

In

1966,

By 1982,

The proportion of the total

benefits rose from 9.6 percent

in

19.1 million aged persons

this number had risen to 29.5

population receiving Medicare
1966 to 12.4 percent in 1982

1982, nearly 97 percent of those over 65 years

of age received

type of Medicare coverage compared to 82 percent in 1966.

alone, 1.8 million aged were newly enrolled

in

By

.

some

During 1982

Medicare; of those who

terminated their coverage (1.6 million), nearly all did so due

to

death. 29
By 1982
55

,

the number

of Medicare enrol lees had risen more than

percent since its first year

in

operation.

The number of eligible

26

persons who actually received
reimbursements under the Medicare
program more than doubled from
the first year of Medicare
until 1982.
At the same time, the number
of Medicare recipients
who were
hospitalized increased from 18.5
percent
1982.

in

1966 to 24.3 percent in

The average reimbursement per
recipient per year also increased

from $592

in

1967 to $2,439.

number of enrol lees,

in

the

increased hospitalizations, and
increased

per

recipient reimbursement was

Medicare program.

The results of the increase

a

large increase in expenditures

for

the

The cost of the program increased nearly
ten fold

from $4,239 billion in 1966 to over
$41,524 billion in 1982. 30

The majority of this money was allocated
to hospitalization
costs.

for

The federal government paid $39.4 billion
for hospitalization

the

elderly

Administration
to

(

in

1982.

According to the Health Care Finance

HCFA) projections, this figure was projected
to rise

$150 billion by 1990.

Hospitalization coverage accounted for over

69 percent of monetary outlays

for Medicare

r ei

mb ur semen

t

3

^

Consequently, Medicare hospitalization insurance became the primary
target for cost containment reform, and was

a

major concern of

Congress when DRGs were proposed. 33
As the outlays for

individuals

Fund

in

the elderly steadily rose, the number of

the workforce contributing to the Social Security Trust

(SSTF) began to decline.

In

SSTF for every benefit recipient.
so

that,

Fund.

In

1950

,

16 workers contributed

During the 60

'

s

to the

this ratio shifted

for every recipient, only five workers contributed to the
the 80's, three workers are responsible

one recipient,

and

for

the support of

projections indicate that the ratio will

be two

27

workers per recipient by the
year 2000.
necessary from each worker to
support
astronomical

The a TO unt of contribution
a

recipient would become

under these conditions. ^3

Escalating health care costs did
not go unnoticed by the
Federal
government and Congress attempted many
different strategies to control
rising health care costs.

But each solution offered to
ameliorate the

problem was either ineffective

achieving the goal of cost

in

containment or unable to rally the
support necessary to insure its
enactment
A

short-term attempt to contain health costs
was Nixon's

Economic Stabilization Program (ESP).

freeze on wages and prices
followed by Phase

II

in

It began with Phase I,

the entire economy.

a

Phase

90 day
I

was

which was aimed at specific controls for
each

major sector of the economy.
based on the uniqueness

of

HEW applied for

the

an

exclusion from ESP

health care industry, but the

Administration denied the request.

According to Abernathy and

Pearson, ESP caused problems for hospitals because hospital
reimbursement methods were

in

fact unique among government contracting

practices for goods and services.

It was

unclear whether the health

care cost controls applied to charges or to cost -based third party
payers.

HEW regulations clarified this problem by defining the cost-

based payments as prices.
annual revenue for prices

The ESP limited the increase

in

aggregate

to six percent, with aggregate wage and

salary increases limited to 5.5 percent, aggregate nonwage and
nonsalary current expenditure increases

limited to 2.5 percent, and

aggregate increases for new technology and new services limited to 1.7

28

percent.

The program was effective
in containing
costs below the

inflation level of the
general economy, but as
soon as
program ended, health care
costs began to rise. 34
other attempts to control

supply of health care.

the temporary

costs were focused on
controlling

Control

health care costs has based
on

of

the

supply to limit the increase

a

demand-pull theory rather

a

capitalist economy.

in

than
supply-demand theory used to explain
the relationship of goals
to
consumption
IS

in

most industries

in

that when third party coverage

is

The argument

extensive the consumer accepts

more care regardless of need. A
kind of Parkinson's Law of
medical
care exists, which states,
"standards of practice will eventually
rise
to absorb the dollars available." 35

The National

Health Planning and Resource Development
Act of

1974 is an example of the effort to
control supply. Under the Planning

Act, 205 regional
recommend to

a

Health System Agencies

(HSAs) were required to

State Health Planning and Development
Agency

(SHPDA)

whether or not proposed health capital expenditures
were appropriate
to the need of the community.
if

Certificates of Need (CONs) were issued

approval was obtained, enabling the hospital to receive
federal

monies for capital expenditures.

The initiation of CONs

provided

a

national means of coordinating health services funding by the federal
government.

By

1979, every state but Missouri

had

some method of

review of health capital expenditure. 35
The true test of success for this legislation was how effective
it

was

in

services.

controlling the increase

in

the supply of facilities and

The evidence indicates that CONs have been

less

than

29

successful.

By 1976.

this program reduced the
rate of growth on

capital expenditures by nine
percent.

This record must be
judged

light of the fact that without
such

a

in

program, the decrease was

projected to be 4.8 percent. 33 when
these results were updated
in
1974, 25 states had certificate
of need programs; the
data indicated

that of those 25, only five
experienced any decrease
capital

It became clear that the lack

at

the growth of

in

expenditures. 38

least in part,

to the

of success of the program
was due,

fact there were no general

guidelines or

criteria upon which programs could base
their decisions
or not to issue

September 197

7

,

a

CON to

a

health care facility.

HEW released

a

as to whether

Therefore,

in

Notice of Proposed Rulemaking which

contained ten standards, "respecting the
appropriate supply. ..of
health resources." 39 The guidelines required
that there be
than four beds per thousand population
an

in

any health service

occupancy rate of at least 80 percent.

no more

area and

The Notice also stated

guidelines regarding supply and occupancy criteria for
obstetrical

beds, neonatal

intensive care units, pediatric beds, coronary care

units, C.A.T. scanners, radiation therapy units, and end-stage
renal

disease units.
A public

outcry began immediately in response to the guidelines.

Most opposition was based on the mistaken assumption

guidelines gave HEW the right

to close hospitals and

assumption was shared by legislators.

that

services.

The effect of the

against the guidelines was that HEW revised them

the
This

outcry

so that the HSAs and

State Health Planning and Development Agencies could deviate from them

30
if

they found that using
the guide! ines disrupted
access to care

«

With the guidelines weakened,
the impact of the Panning
Act was small
to non-existent.
The Social

Security Amendments of
1971 mandated the creation
of
Professional Standards Review
Organizations (PSROs) as
another cost

containment mechanism.

PSROs were formed and charged
with the

responsibility to review the
appropriateness of institutional
utilization of Medicare and Medicaid
recipients.

the

PSROs suffered from

same lack by guidelines and
criteria faced by HSAs.

Without

guidelines or clearly delineated
sanctions, enforcement of the
program
was virtually impossible.
One of the most exhaustive
evaluations of
the effectiveness of PSROs was
done by HEW's Office of Planning,
Evaluation and Legislation (OPEL) in
1977.

This study provided very

little conclusive evidence that PSROs
were effective

in

decreasing

utilization and in fact, found that the
operational costs of the
program were actually increasing federal health
expenditures.
In April

1977, President Carter attempted

to
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control

soaring

health costs by proposing the Hospital Cost
Containment Act.
Carter proposal placed

a

ceiling on reimbursement rates to hospitals,

which was to be lowered over several consecuti
and turbulent debates and negotiations

passed.

The

in

ve years.

Congress,

Because of the need for some mechanism

it

After long

failed to be

to control

light of the failure of the Carter Administration's

Representative Daniel Rostenkowski

(

Democrat

health care providers to voluntarily control

- II

1 i

nois

costs in

proposal,
)

challenged

their costs.

Major

health groups such as American Medical Association (AMA), American
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Hospita! Association (AHA,

,

and Federation of
American Hospitals

quickly responded and by
December of 1977 had formed

a

,

FAH

steering

corrmittee to meet his
challenge.

During the first few months
of operation, the
voluntary program
appeared to be successful.
By May 1978, the rate
of increase in
hospital expenditures had dropped
to 12.6 percent.^
Unfortunately,
later in the year it became
clear that the early evidence
had been too
optimistic and that the voluntary
program did not have enough
clout to
control health costs.

This was the last attempt during
the Carter Administration
at
health care cost containment

legislation.

Other issues became the

focus of his attention and the last
year was dominated by his concern
over the Americans held hostages in
Iran.

In

November 1980, President

Carter was defeated by Ronald Reagan who
became the 40th President of
the United States.

The Reagan campaign

promised voters lower taxes

and decreased government spending.
In

an

effort to adhere to his campaign pledge, President
Reagan

proposed an enormous tax reduction program in
1981.

law was referred to
provided

a

The subsequent

the Economic Recovery Act (ERTA) of 1981, and

as

$3.7 billion tax cut in fiscal year 1982. 44 A tax reduction

of this magnitude had

a

large impact on collected revenues.

The

estimated amount of lost revenues under the plan was $267,627 million
by 1986. 45

The rationale for the bill
real

reflected

growth of the economy which had slowed

stopped

in

1980

.

a

desire to enhance the
in

1978 and 1979 and

The unemployment rate rose significantly

in

1980,
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and the belief was that
tax breaks to business
and industry would
increase the demand for labor.
Problems from the decreased
revenue

would disappear if projections
of the economic growth
effect of the
tax reductions were correct
and devastating if the
anticipated results
did not materialize. 46 Obviously,
funding for Medicare could
be a
very serious problem if the
worst case scenerio became
reality.
Thus

at the same time that taxes were
being reduced, Congressional
concern

regarding the rising costs of Plan A
of Medicare was voiced
within the
Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1981.
Part of the law required that the
Secretary of Health and Human

Services (HHS) formerly Health Education
and Welfare develop

prospective payment system for Plan

A

of Medicare.

a

Throughout the

first quarter of 1982, the staff at HCFA
intensified their discussion

of different models of prospective pricing
without deciding on

specific one to base the model
Reconciliation Act of 1981.
diminished

in

called for

the Omnibus

in

The urgency to select

a

specific PPS was

a

February 1982, when Carolyne Davis, Director of the

HCFA, wrote to Ann T. Hunsaker, Assistant General Council,
HHS,
informing her that the staff at HCFA was working on
be

ready for implementation by the

sunnier

a

PPS that would

or early fall

of 1982

,

"as

requested by Richard Schweiker in accordance with the Omnibus

Reconciliation Act."

In

response to the memo from Davis, Hunsaker

wrote that the law required that

a

implementation.

according to Hunsaker, would raise

Such

a

move,

PPS be developed, but did not imply

"inevitable and immediate" legal battle. 47 Congress,
might want to have something to say about the form

a

in

an

other words,

PPS might take.
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Unfortunately, many of the
optimistic projections relating
economic growth were incorrect.

the

It became apparent
early

country was headed toward

a

fiscal

in 1982 that

crisis.

Moreover,

disturbingly, the cost of medical
care continued to rise
despite a declining inflation
rate.
Hospital

to

in

1982

costs constituted the

major part of health care
expenditures and were rising
faster than any

Other

form of health service.

«

The increase was particularly

unnerving to legislators because
the federal government paid
for more
medical services under its programs
than any
other single insurer.

Before congressional action was taken
to allow implementation of
the prospective payment system
requested

in

Act of 1981, Congress repeated its
request

prospective payment

in

the Omnibus Reconciliation
for

another piece of legislation:

and Fiscal Responsibility Act of
1982 (TEFRA).

Committee on Ways
for

the development of a

and Means of the House was

proposed tax reform and

recommended legislative action.

In

the Tax Equity

July of 1982, the

unable to draw up a bill

instead developed

a

print which

The print was designed to represent

H.R. 6878, upon which the Committee on Ways and Means
did not vote.

Instead of voting, on July 15, the Corunittee decided to go
directly to

conference on the Senate amendments to H.R. 4961 (H.R.
4961, as
amended and approved by the Senate, contained the spending and tax
provisions developed by the Senate Finance Committee pursuant to the

fiscal

year

1983 First Concurrent Budget Resolution).

The print,

which explained the potential bill, was prepared to provide further

information on committee decisions which would serve

as

point for conferees and members of the public.

the Committee

In

it,

a

reference
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required the Secretary to deveiop
hospitals to be implemented
by both

in

a

October, 1983 unless

the House and Senate by July

insure implementation of
not accomplished

in

prospective payment pian for

1

,

1983.

it

was disapproved

The print intended to

prospective payment system (PPS)
which was

a

the Omnibus Reconciliation
Act of 1981 . 50

The Senate bill, which corresponded
to the House Committee

Print,

required that the Secretary develop

a

PPS proposal

in

consultation with the House Committee on
Ways and Means and the Senate

Finance Committee, stipulating that
implementation of the proposal
would require a vote of acceptance in
the House and Senate.
The

deadline for submission
31, 1982.

to Congress of the PPS proposal

was December

The intent and language of the Senate
amendment emerged

in

the conference report.^

The legislative outcome of the House
Committee Print and the
Senate Bill was the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility
Bill of 1982

(TEFRA)

Public Law 97-248

,

which was enacted

response to the budget deficit. It contained
in

a

in

August. TEFRA was

$98.3 billion

revenue through tax increases and $17.5 billion

Most of the spending cuts made by the bill
targeted at Medicare.

in

a

increase

spending cuts.

($13.3 billion) were

Savings were estimated at $2.9 billion

in

1983,

$4.4 billion in 1984 and $6 billion in 1985. 52 The source of savings

was expected
hospitalization.

to

emerge from the control

The bill placed

a

of

the

ceiling on the amount the federal

government would reimburse hospitals for care provided
recipients.

Also included

in

cost of

to Medicare

the law were provisions that created new

guidelines regarding individual

coverage, membership of Medicare

35

recipients

Health Maintenance
Organizations (HMOs), and
alternative
health plans and modes of
instructional care.
in

Hospital
In

Re imbursement

Provisions in JEFRA

terms of understanding the
passage of prospective
payment

legislation

in

1983

,

the hospital reimbursement
provisions of TEFRA

are important because they
established
deliberations and actions.
-

a

context

for

the

later

Some of the key provisions
were:

An expansion of existing
cost limits restricting payments
to a

hospital for routine operating costs.

It set the limit at
120 percent

of such costs in 1983, 115 percent
in 1984 and 110 percent in
1985.
-

A hospital

the difference.

whose costs rose less than the ceiling
could keep

One whose costs rose more were to
receive one-fourth

of the excess costs

the bill's enactment.

for excess costs.
adjust hospital
-

An

incurred, but only for the first two years
after

After that, no reimbursement would be

provided

The Secretary of HHS received authorization
to

target costs based on

a

case-mix index.

authorization for the Secretary

of HHS

to calculate

Medicare reimbursement based on state rather than federal
standards

in

states with their own cost containment program.
-

within

A requirement that

the Secretary of HHS submit to Congress

five months of enactment,

a

payments to hospitals and nursing homes.

procedure for "prospective"
Payments were then to be set

each year based on the institutions' anticipated costs of caring for
medicare clients.

This new reimbursement plan would

unless authorized by Congress.

not be enacted

36
-

A

prevision to suspend
payments for the last
six weeks of

fncal year 1983

and 1984 until

the beginning of
the following

f

iscal

year

TEFRA set the stage for
the DRG legislative
proposal in 1983.
It Placed the
responsibility for the
development of a plan for
prospective payment in the
hands of the Secretary
of HHS, Richard
Schweiker.
It also established
a timetable for
presentation of his
proposal to Congress. The
report Schweiker sent to
Congress in
December 1982, in accordance
with the provisions of
TEFRA, became the

framework for P.L. 98-21, Title
VI

of the Social

Which, for the first time,
established

a

Security Amendments,

prospective payment system

for Plan A coverage of
Medicare.

Hospitals began to view rising health
care costs
following the passage of TEFRA.

a

problem

The fiscal constraints on
hospitals

caused by the reimbursement ceiling
established
hospitals.

as

in

TEFRA hurt

Consequently, the AHA and FAH were
predisposed to accept

any reasonable alternative
(prospective payment) when it was presented
to them in December of 1982.

According to legislative staff,

hospitals' fear of the tightening reimbursement
guidelines was one of
the primary reasons DRGs were readily
accepted. 54

Legislators began the 98th Congress
bleak economy and

a

in

January of 1983 with the

growing deficit as the pressing issue.

biggest public expenditures was fixed
program. Social Security.

to

a

One of the

politically volatile

The funding crisis of the Social

Security

Program related to rising health care costs did not come
out of the
blue.

It

was the culmination of the evolution

of health policy and

37

the

result of some unanticipated
fiscal impacts that arose
from
previous legislation. The Medicare
program that came out of
the
expansionary period of health
policy enactments was
designed to

increase the accessibility of
health care to the elderly
and through
its enactment, the Federal
government became the primary
purchaser of
health care.
But it was the growth of this
program and others similar
to it that led to the concern
over rising health care
expenditures.

There was growing realization

health costs.

that action must be taken to
control

Legislators were challenged to find

a

means of meeting

their objective which would be palatable
to their constituents; but,

much of the groundwork had been laid as
they turned their attention to
this problem in the early months of 1983.
next chapter.

This is the subject of the
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CHAPTER

III

THE POLICY

Recognition by Congress and
the Administration

in

1982 of the

problem of escalating health
care costs as set forth
in the previous

chapter was

a

necessary first step

in

the policy process.

The
explanation of the adoption
of Diagnosis Related
Groups (DRGs) as the
mechanism for controlling escalating
health costs takes us
deeper
into
the bureaucracy. The decision
to present a Prospective
Payment System
(PPS) based on the DRG model
was made within the
Department of Health
and Human Services ( H H
When the Omnibus Reconciliation
S)
Act of
.

1981, calling for

a

PPS proposal

from the Secretary of HHS

August 1981, the actual configuration
of such
A

task

force was formed

in

,

passed

in

system was undecided.

a

early 1982 by Carolyne Davis,
Director of

the Health Care Finance Administration

(

HCFA)

,

Division of HHS and

chaired by Thomas Burke, Chief of Staff
at HHS, “to review alternative

prospective payment systems and to provide the
Administrator with an
analytical report on these options." 1

Task

force membership consisted of Norman Passas
of Ernst and

Whinney, Martin Drebin, V.P. Finance, Evanston
Hospital Corporation,

Frank Sloan, Vanderbilt Institute of Public
Policy Studies, Health
Policy Center and James Bentley of the American
Association of Medical

41

COlle96S (AAMC)

"""

-

—

42

'l-fPS -cams.

for control 1 ing
health expenditures
presented to the Prospective
Payment Task Force
(PPTF).
The task force
evaluated each option
in terms of its
impact
on beneficiaries,
providers, the Federal
budget, third-party
payers
total syste m costs,
implementation protocol,
and overall pros and
cons.

The eight options
presented to the Task
Force for analysis were:
Option I:
Prospective Payment by Groupings

Variation

A:

Payment per admission with
a
Patient Mix Adjustment
(DRG Model)

Variation

B:

Payment per admission for
Similar Hospitals

Option II:

Indemnity

Variation A:

Set the indemnity at a
per diem basis

Variation

Set the indemnity on a per
admission basis
with a patient mix adjustment

B:

Variation C:

Set the

Variation D:

Set the Indemnity based on
patient groupings
K
y
with co-payment.

indemnity on

unit of service basis

Opti on III:

Competitive Bidding

Option

Payment on Individual Case Rate

IV:

Option V:

Rate of Increase Control
admission)

Option VI:

Individual

Option VII:

Individual Hospital Negotiated Rates

Option VIII:

Capitation

its final

(on hospital

costs/

Hospital Budget Review

The PPTF gave the DRG model
In

a

a

relatively positive evaluation.

report submitted to Thomas Burke on March

1

,

1982

,

the

43

identified only two
potential

syste. based on

problems w1th .
prospective pay^nt

case-mix index.

a

The first was

a potentially
decreased aggregate
reimbursement for hospitals
that care for less

complex patient mixes.

The otner
other was that
that- of
possible manipulation of

diagnoses to maximize
reimbursement.

3

Other options did not fair
as well under the
scrutiny of the
task force.

The average number of
negative impacts identified

seven alternative options
was

than three.

the

in

four with no other option
receiving less

4

Along With the PP^'s
appraisal of each option, the
staff at HHS
solicited an outside opinions to
obtain more information
regarding the

three options
Mix;

III.

(Option

I

A.

payment with adjustment for
Patient Case

competitive bidding; and VIII.
capitation) which were most

favorably judged by the task force.
Richard
and Actuary,

Prudential
in the

the office of Health Policy
Coordination of the

Insurance Company was consulted
because of his involvement

development and implementation of the
DRG model of prospective

payment

in

is the one

Mel
11,

in

J. Melman, Vice President

1

New Jersey. The only documented
consultation

in

HCFA files

solicited from Mellman by Burke.
man

responded

in

a

letter to Thomas Burke, dated February

1982, providing a brief evaluation of the options

and

indicating

which option he thought would be the most feasible
solution to control
health care costs.

that he found

in

Mellman addressed the strengths and weaknesses

each option,

might be construed as

this,

a

but,

cautioned that each of the three

preferred provider plan.

A

major pitfall

according to Mellman, was that "anti -discriminati

on and

in

free

44

Choice of provider laws
commonly stifle innovation
According to Heilman, the
foible

in

the capitation

in

this area

"

(Option VI,

I, was
would encourage hospitals
to shift those
costs that the
government did not reimburse
to other patients who
are privately
insured.
Competition (Option I,
I) according to Mellman,
would

that

it

create

"dominance of hospitals that are
not burdened with

social
responsibilities to the degree that
are teaching hospitals
or innercity hospitals that minister
to the medically indigent." 5

Mellman

evaluation of the options
favored the DRG-based model,

s

which he selected because this
system had not had major
negative
impacts on the New Jersey health
care system.
According to him,
a.

Prel lminary indications are
that the program is savino th P
9
C m
nS
dol1ars wl'thout impairing quality
of C are
anH \ h l V°

and

that hospital expenditures in
New Jersey are now
S ln9 Slgnificant1
* ^ss steeply than the'nat i onal
av er a ge
n

re

.

b.

The program provides for equitable
charges to all patients
regardless of who provides their coverage.
This means there
can be more meaningful competition
between Blue Cross
insurance companies. Health Maintenance
Organizations and
employer and union health benefit
plans
competition ’which
will accrue to the advantage of all
New Jersey citizens.
,

c.

In

The program has restored the solvency of
New Jersey's inner
city hospitals, most of which were
financially distressed
because of the shortcomings of the previous
methods of
hospital payment.
As long as the New Jersey Hospital Rate
Setting program is operative, center -city
hospitals in Newark
Camden, Paterson, and Atlantic City need not fear
that they
will suffer the fate that is befalling hospitals in
New York
and in many of our country's other major cities.

July 1982, despite Mellman's detailed analysis and vigorous

advocacy and the task force report, the legislative staff at the

Health Care Finance Administration

(HCFA) remained undecided

what model prospective payment would adhere.

as

to

45

SChWe1ker Was COmmitted
t0
payment.

*

According to Schweiker,

•

Ms

x model

of prospective

desire to have prospective

payment enacted during his
appointment as Secretary
of Health
Human Services stemmed,

in

and

part, from the fact
that as Senator he had

been unable to contain
health care costs.
containment legislative faux

One specific cost

pas identified by
Schweiker was his

support for voluntary cost
containment in 1979, which
was unsuccessful
in curbing escalating
health care costs.
Schweiker's interest in

prospective payment went back
to

his consultation
with John Thompson

of Yale University during
the Senate hearings on
cost -containment from
1977 to 1979.* Schweiker was
also strongly inflated by
Jack Owens

Who supported the DRG system
first as President of the
New Jersey
Hospital Association and later
as the Executive Vice
President of the
American Hospital Association
(AHA).
According to Schweiker, Owens
had told him that the
prospective payment system in New
Jersey was

able to decrease health care
expenditures and increase hospital
profits while maintaining quality care.
Owens believed that hospital

associations would support prospective
payment because of these
attributes and Schweiker respected Owen's
opinion, having worked with

him, as well,

during his years on the Health and Human
Resources

Conmittee of the Senate.

7

*Richard Schweiker (Republ ican-Pennsylvania represented
the 13th
District of
Pennsylvania
from
1960-1967 and
was Senator from
Pennsylvania
from 1969-1980.
In the Senate Schweiker was a member of
the Appropr iations Committee,
Rules and Administration Committee and
the Ranking Member of the HEW Subcommittee of the
Labor Corrmittee and
Ranking Member of the Health and Human Resources Committee.
In that
capacity he was able to significantly influence the direction of
the
United States' health policy.
)
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Schweiker sought support
for

™del Within

a

case-mix prospective
payment

HCFA.

This was difficult
because this approach
was not
supported by most of the
HCFA staff who had
come on board with the
Reagan Administration.
The newcomers viewed
the staff i„ the
Office
of Research and
Demonstrations (ORD) who had
been developing a TOt
hod
of setting national
health care prices based
in part on DRGs
since the
Middle of the 1960s, with
disdain.8 The incoming
staff perceived DRGs
as the product of a
democratic

administration that was
excessively

regulatory.

became

a

Actual

antagonism developed between
the groups.

"DRGs

dirty word" among HCFA
legislative and policy staff,

according to one researcher.

staff recall that Schweiker
consistently supported the DRG
case-mix model despite its unpopularity
in HCFA. An example of
this

attitude was evidenced when Michael
Maher, Director

of the Office of

Reimbursement Policy, was describing the
wage index adjustment under
the DRG model

for two different geographic regions.

complained that Maher's presentation was
vague and

Schweiker interrupted their criticism
clarity of the presentation.

Staff at HHS
"a

,

9

to

Most of the staff

incomprehensible.

support Maher and praise the

According to Thomas Burke, Chief of

the final decision to go with the DRG model
of PPS was

Schweiker call all the way." 10
By July

1982, Richard Schweiker had gathered enough data

support his position.

Council

at HHS,

to

Correspondenc e from Juan del Real, General

and Thomas Donnelly, Assistant to the Secretary for

Legislation at HHS indicated that the best of the eight alternative
options presented to the PPTF was the one based on DRGs.

11

’

12
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m

memo from Richard Schweiker
to Carolyne Davis
dated August
4, 1982, Schweiker confirmed
that the
a

PPS was going to be
based on the

DRG model. 13 Schweiker
part, on the fact

selection of the DRG model
was based,

's

in

that there were serious
flaws in several of the

other options, which Mellman
had indicated.

But perhaps more
importantly, Schweiker realized
that the DRG model was
technically

feasible because

it was

a

wel

1

-developed and refined system
which had

been an effective mechanism for
health cost control

state for a two year period.

devised

a

Furthermore, 0R0 within HCFA had
already

strategy for implementation of

payment system.

A detailed

for an entire

a

national

prospective

review of the development of the
model,

its subsequent link to resource
consumption, evaluation of its ability

to contain health costs and examination
of the results of ORD's
efforts will

illustrate the attractiveness of this option
to Schweiker

and how he was able to persuade key
legislative actors to his point of
view. The DRG option was simply the most
viable approach to the goal
of cost containment.

The Development of the DRG Model

The development of DRGs began

Initially, the model was designed

as

in

1969 at Yale University.

a

means of evaluating both the

quality of care and the utilization of services
setting. 14 Its primary objective was

in

the hospital

to provide a definition of case

types of patients, each of which should receive similar outputs or

services from hospitals.

The following attributes of the model were

deemed necessary by researchers to permit implementation

in

a

wide

48

range of settings as well
as make the system
meaningful to medical and
non-medical users:
1

.

It must be interpretabl
e medically with suhrlaccpc
from homogeneous diagnostic
categories
That ic
e;

S

particular
°i -“I?**"
patient management
2

.

na4 .-ie n
h

,

.

s
[

^

process by them.

Individual

classes should be defined on
variables that are
hospital abstracts and are
relevant to
output utilization, pertaining to
either the condition
00 or
of the
patient or the treatment process.

”™°''^available

3.

There must be a manageable number
of classes
Dreferahiv -in
the hundreds instead of thousand,
that are mutually exclusie
>
and evha„ ctl „e
they must cover the entir
diSeaS6 cond1tions in the acute rare
setting, without
overlap?

4.

The classes should contain patients
with similar expected
P
measures of output utilization.

5.

Class definitions must be comparable across
different codi ng

schemes. 10

Following these guidelines, researchers constructed

a

basic

framework of case types consisting of 500 different
diagnostic groups.

They then began to test potential ways of organizing the
groups.

The

first approach they tried was surveying physicians by
asking them
to define case types using variables which the physicians believed
to

be

important for determining the type and amount of resources

utilized.

This method was abandoned because physicians tended

to

define patients based on specific data that was unavailable on patient

abstracts.

The resulting specificity increased the potential number

of diagnostic classes into the thousands.

Consequently, the decision

was made to base class definition on data from acute care hospitals

with consultation from physicians.

This data was examined to
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determine the general
characteristics and relative
frequency
discharges.

of

Statistical algorithms were
used on

the data to suggest
ways of forming patient
classes that were
“homogeneous with respect to
some aggregate output
utilization measure.^ Length
„ f stay wa$
initial measure of output.

^

The DRGs were then formed
by partitioning the
data base into
mutually exclusive and exhaustive
primary diagnoses referred
to as
Major Diagnostic Categories
(MDCs).
Each
MDC was subdivided based
on

variables determined by the
statistical algorithms.
then subjected to further physician
review.
class definitions varied

was found to be
patients, but not
of

final

in

The variables included in

different categories.

important
in

Each category was

in

For example, age

explaining utilization

gastric ulcer patients.

classifications were formed.

17

From each MDC

Initial

in

hernia

a

number

division of classes

was made into 83 MDCs, which were mutually
exclusive and exhaustive.

The next phase of development was the
subdivisions for the MDCs.

The set of records analyzed to determine

the MDCs was used as input
development.

In

identification of the

in

the second stage of category

this stage, algorithms were applied to indicate

groups of observations on the basis of independent variables
that had
been determined prior to statistical

analysis.

The set of independent

variables was limited to those which related

to

the patient's

condition, his treatment process (which was readily accessible on the

patient abstract), along with his age, sex, and

in

some cases the

clinical service. Groups were then generated based on

appropriate variable, i.e., the variable that:

(1)

the most

exhibited

a
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significant decrease

in

variance relative to other
variables,
(

created

a

manageable number of groups
based on

relatively small

a

number of values of the
independent variable, and
whose means were significantly
18

2)

created groups

(3)

different.

The groups were further
subdivided, according to the
same
criteria used for generation of
the initial MDCs.
The partitioning
into groups continued until
the group became too small
to warrant

further classification or until

none of the variables
reduced

unexplained variation by at least one
percent.
This process yielded

388 final groups or DRGs

Each of the

.

groups was defined according to the
patient characteristics of primary

diagnosis, primary surgical procedure,
secondary surgical
age,

and
An

of DRGs

(in one

instance) clinical

setting.

example of the partitioning process involved
is

seen

in

Figure

1.

The

procedure,

MDC,

in

the formation

Urinary Calculus, includes

patients with calculus of the kidney or ureter
and calculus of other

parts of the urinary system.

First, the MDC

groups based on the variable of surgical

surgical

is

subdivided

procedure.

into three

Then the non-

category is further subdivided into two groups based on the

presence or absence of

a

urinary calculi results

in

The next step was

basis of patient care

secondary diagnosis.

In

all,

the MDC of

the formation of four DRGs.

a

comparison of hospitals' performance on the

—

related measurements such as length of stay,

costs and mortality to observe whether or not differences among

hospitals could be attributed to their case-mix index.

This was an

effort to determine if hospitals with high costs were treating
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Figure 1.

Tree diagram illustrating partitioning of urinary
calculus patients.
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severely

il,

patients with ,ong ,engths
of stay or if they
were

consuming more resources
for patients for other
reasons.
DRGs, by themselves, were
not particularly
useful instruments.
Their value was not realized
until they were applied
clinically to

Predict resource consumption
based

on patient classification.

Wort

done in the late 1970s was
directed toward the development
of DRGs on
a hospital -wide basis.
All patients in an
institution were classified
according to DRGs providing a
case-mix index of the
hospital.
Based
on them, hospitals could
measure and define more precisely
output
products in a complex health delivery
system.

The major objective was to group
patients into categories that
have similar resource consumption
patterns.
The projected result of

classification was to enable planners
to potentially control the
"production process." 22
A

software package entitled AUTOGRP was
developed

statistical analysis.

to refine

The development of the AUTOGRP software
package

increased the confidence of those working on
the DRG based system that
it could predict

and potentially control

in-patient health costs.

Using AUTOGRP data could be analyzed on

an

preliminary development of DRGs), on

institutional

mi x adjustments,

an

individual

and potentially on a regional

basis

(as

basis for

or national

level

in

the

case24

With funds from the Public Health Service, Thompson, Fetter, and
Moss

(the Yale research team) studied eighteen hospitals'

related product groups" for hospital

"diagnostic-

in-patient non-maternity clients.

Using AUTOGRP they tested the case-mix differences according to DRGs
and demonstrated a significant relationship

between the diagnostic
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groups of patients and
service costs.
predicted for each hospitai
P

tals in the area.

Resource consumption was
then

based on case-mix and
fees from other

The goal

of the study was to
determine if the

predictions were accurate enough
that prices and
reimbursement rates
for hospitals could be
set based on a diagnosis
specific indicator.
They concluded "...Serious
consideration should be given
to the use of
these diagnostic-specific case
costs as a basis for
reimbursement for
hospital services." 25
By 1978 the research team,
began to publish evidence
of the
usefulness of the DRG case-mix
system as a pricing and potential

reimbursement mechanism for in-patient
health care in the acute
setting. They also began to market
this model to health
administrators. They emphasized the fact
that accounting based

on the

DRG model could enhance management's
control over health care, by

allowing hospital administrators

to more firmly grasp the production

process.

Further refinement and testing of the DRG
concept occurred
during the next several years.

however,

New Jersey.

in

The major application took place,

The effectiveness of the New Jersey

experiment provided Schweiker with further justification
for his
selection of

a

case-mix model of prospective payment.

The New Jersey Experiment

During the sixties

a

consensus had emerged

increased state regulation of health care.
1

974

furthered that objective

by

in

New Jersey for

Governor Brendan

Byrne

in

appointing Dr. Joanne Finley,
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Commi ssi oner of the
Department of Health.
DP. Finley served as
city health officer

and as an

in

Prior to her appointment

New Haven, Connecticut

adjunct faculty member
at the Vale University
School of

Medicine, Department of
Public Health. 26
As commissioner.

Fin lev's
y

nriman/
p unary goal was improvement
of the

New Jersey health care
delivery system through
exploration of
alternative mechanisms of finance.
Not

surprisingly, prospectively
setting health care costs
according to diagnosis was
the instrument of
reform favored by Finley. She
solicited aid from Thompson
and Fetter
at Yale to develop a prospective
payment system that could be
implemented throughout the stated
The basic objectives of the
system
were to:

establish

a

hospital

case-mix profile;

-

establish reasonable costs related
to that case-mix;

-

reimburse promptly;

-

approve the payment promptly and equitably
among payers

according to the kinds of patients for
which they are
responsible; and
reward hospitals which perform well under
such standards. 28

The system was developed based on diagnosis

collected from New Jersey hospitals for
Thompson and Fetter separated

They were:

indirect costs, and (3)

these costs over

a

cost data

the period

1976-1979.

costs into three overall categories.

direct patient care costs,

(1)

and

(2)

indirect patient care costs.

12 month period,

a

mixed direct and
Then, projecting

model was developed. 29
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There were four major
ingredients of the New
Jersey p ra gram.
The first was the
concept of hospitai
incentives. This meant
the
hospitals Which provided
services at less
than the cost allocated
by

DRGs could keep the
difference.

teaching equalization.

The second aspect
was

labor and

This reflected that
eleven labor markets had

been identified to account
for different wage
compensation patterns in
New Jersey.
A set of requirements were
designed also to differentiate
between teaching and non-teaching
hospitals to adjust for
compensation
differences based on resource
consumption
in

Outliers were also

(Outlier was

a

introduced as

term used to denote

standard DRG.) Outliers were

concept into the system.

patient who did not fit into

a

a

identified by reviewing the
patient's

record regarding length of stay.
all

a

each.

patients in New Jersey fell

Data

indicated that two percent of

into this category.

Finally, penalties were also built into
the system.

The major

penalty was the rule that hospitals which
spent over the sum allocated

based on the case-mix DRGs would

be

receipt of its proposed reimbursement

engage
Once an

in

a

,

forced to incur the cost.

hospitals could accept

series of appeals to adjust it to

appeal

a

Upon
it

or

more suitable level.

process was completed, the rate was fixed for the

institution for the upcoming fiscal year.^

Application of the DRG model of prospective payment system
New Jersey was effective

in

controlling health care costs.

in

The annual

percent increase of in-patient costs per capita was 11.7 percent for

New Jersey in

1977 and

12.8 percent nationally that year.

In 1981,
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the comparative

fi gu

nationally 17.7 percent. 3 ^

The National

Implementation Plan

Another factor which motivated
Schweiker
lker tto submit
model of prospective
payment to Congress was
national implementation of
the system had been

a

case-mix

e

project became employees of ORD
within the new agency. 32
The methodology used to develop
the national prospective
payment

plan was analogous to that employed
by Thompson and Fetter in
New

Jersey.

The sources of data used by the
team to compute

reimbursement rate were

bills

a

a

national

20 percent random sample of Medicare
patient

(referred to as the MEOPAR file), and

the Bureau of Labor Statistics

(

a

wage index collected by

BLS) of the Department of Labor. 33 The

MEDPAR data file contained charges, diagnosis,
procedures, age, etc.
The data enabled DRG weights to be set describing

the expected

Medicare case.

in

relative terms

cost of different Medicare cases compared to an average
An example of the mechanism is that of a

The relative DRG price for

a

craniotomy case (DRG

1)

is

craniotomy.
3.5, meaning

that craniotomy cases are expected to be 3.5 times more expensive
than

the average Medicare case which would have

a

value of 1.0. 34
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Medicare cost reports,
the wage index
ndex were combined to
create

per discharge.

Thi

s

a

,

and a Medicare

national representati
ve cost

treated each hospital
as though

"average" mix of patients,
paid the nationai

teaching program.

f roB BLS

The initial

that the total hospital

it served

"average" wage and had no

price set per discharge
was low enough

annual reimbursement did
not exceed

ceiling already set by the
passage of TEFRfl

in

1982.

discharge

(cranitotomy) became $3,000

1

is

x

the

Expansion on the

craniotomy example indicates
the impact of this
process.
national representative cost per
price for DRG

an

If the

set at $3,000, then the

3.5 = $10,500.

This was
the mechanism used to set the
prices for each of the 467
DRGs. 35

Researchers adjusted

variations

in

the national

the wage index established by
the BLS for approximately

300 different geographic areas.
a

schedule according to

Consequently, based on the location,

separate price was established and
could be further subdivided

within

a

state into Standard Metropolitan
Statistical Areas

and non-standard Metropolitan Statistic
Areas

that
case,

in

This meant

any given SMSA, payment became the same
for the same type of

independent of the hospital
Several

data

(non-SMSAs).

(SMSAs)

in

which service was provided.^

basic premises emerged as the team at HCFA analyzed
the

for potential

implementation.

These served as

a

framework for

the development of the proposal which eventually became
known as the

Schweiker Report.
1.

Prospectivity itself seems to be effective

in

holding down

rates of increase of hospital costs.
2.

prospective payment systems require consideration of
hospital's case-mix for the system to be equitable.

All

a

—
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Take into account these premises,
the staff at HCFA designed
a system
which could predict the total
annual costs for each hospital
in the
United States through analysis of
the hospital's case-mix index
based

on the DRG model.

The staff further decided that
a technically and

politically feasible legislative proposal
for prospective payment
should include the following exclusions
from the prospective payment

formula:
(1)

T^ e

ev aluation of the capital worth of

exclusion included interest, rent and depreciation.

a

facility

:

This

The rationale was

based on variability of interest rates, age of
hospitals, and
equipment which made measurement of these values difficult.
(

2

)

The direct and indirect costs associated with medical

education in teaching hospitals

:

These costs had always been paid by
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Medicare,

it

was

recorded

not to ter mi „ate
this practice

Continuance would also assure
that the Pase rate
related to patient
outco m e would not be
affected. There are

always indirect increased

costs which occur when
a patient is treated
in a teaching hospital
te$tS - reduces, examinations,
( m °re
etc.,.
an attempt to avoid
penalizing teaching hospitals
for their intensive
care regimes the
l-ngher costs were
excluded or passed through
the prospective payment
system.
The recognition of the
cost was handled by
providing a lump
sum payment to teaching
hospitals.
(3)

to

Out- patient care

lack of an

:

These practices were excluded
mainly due

instrument that could reliably
set the price for the

services
(4)

Plan

B

services:

Consisting of the ancillary services

provided by hospitals, they were
excluded mainly on the grounds of

precedence
suppliers.

in

that Medicare had traditionally
allowed separate

A major potential

could begin
reimbursement.

to contract

problem was noted here

out

all

in that

hospitals

of these services to increase

The need for monitoring was indicated.

Special

classes of hospitals:

Including psychiatric,

pediatric and long-term care facilities, they were
placed outside the

coverage based on the fact that DRGs were designed
to be used

in

short-term general hospitals and therefore had questionable
validity
for specialty institutions.
(6)

Atyp i cal

Cases

extremely short or long

in

:

Defined as outliers or cases which were
length of stay, they were relatively rare

but the cost consequences were determined to be so variable that they
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had to be excluded.

These cases were to
be identified

institution prior to
admission,

Full reimbursement

to consist of only
one-half of one percent
of all
in

a

for

by

the

outliers was

cases receiving care

given year.

State Exemptions

Several

states currently received
exemptions from the
Medicare
regulations because they were
engaged in experimental
cost containment

P

g

ms.

The states

regulation waivers were:

designated

to maintain Medicare
reimbursement

Connecticut, Maryland,
Massachusetts, New

Jersey, New York, Rhode
Island, Washington, and
Wisconsin.

For reasons

primarily related to political

issues, Health

Maintenance Organizations and
facilities that had a "sole
community
provider" status were specifically
brought into the prospective
payment system. Moreover, it was
thought that the legislation
should

provide for recalibration of DRG
prices by the Secretary of Health
and
Human services on an annual basis.
The recalibration was designed
to
reflect changes

in

health prices and in the relative
price structure

of the country, and provide
an opportunity to regularly
review the

fairness and effectiveness of the PPS
system.

It

is

noteworthy that

once the rate was set, because the
prospective payment system was

budget neutral, the annual

funds designated for Medicare

hospitalization reimbursement remained constant.

For example, to

increase revenues for outlier compensation, funds could
be decreased
in

the wage rate adjustment to adjust for the
growing expenditures

elsewhere

in

the budget without altering the system's net budget. 39
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Summary
As noted,

HHS

in

August 1982, the stage
was set for the Secretary
of
to meet the mandate
of TEFRA and submit
a report to Congress
on a

prospective payment system to
contain costs associated
with
hospitalizations under Medicare.
The system
focused only on

hospitalization charges for two
reasons:

they constituted the
most

significant Medicare outlays and
the DRG model had only
been tested in
the acute care setting.
The narrow focus of the
system minimized

potential opposition from the AMA
and alternative health care
facilities.

Most importantly, the DRG model
of cost containment was

chosen because
effective.

it

had been tested at the state
level and found

Still, while prospects

perspective of "downtown bureaucrats,"

looked promising from the
it was

clear to Schweiker that

"on the hill" widespread ignorance
about the issue

effort

in

existed.

A major

"legislative persuasion" remained to be
accomplished

was to be enacted.

This is the topic of the next chapter.

if

PPS
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chapter

IV

the political stream

Rising health care
costs were identified
as

a problem and
a
Policy had been developed
to contain these
expenditures, but the issue
needed to enter the
political stream before it
could

be embodied

in

legation.

The proposed prospective
payment system (PPS) entered
the
pol 1 1 i cal stream after
several unsuccessful
attempts, as a result of
the passage of the Tax
Equity and Fiscal
Responsibility Act of 1982
(TEFRA).
A component of TEFRA
required Schweiker to subnit
a proposal
for prospective payment
to the Senate Finance and
House Ways and Means

Committee for review and discussion.

A

review of the events

surrounding placement and subsequent
adoption of the proposal

that the course the policy took

in

the political

indicate

stream insured the

enactment of prospective payment.

Getting on the Agenda

The following paragraph

in TEFRA placed a

prospective payment

system on the legislative calendar:
The Secretary shall develop, in consultation
with the Senate
committee on Finance and the Committee on Ways
and Means of
the House of Representatives, proposals
for legislation

which would provide that hospitals, skilled
nursing
acilities, and, to the extent feasible, other providers
would be reimbursed under Title XVIII of this Act on a
prospective basis. The Secretary shall report such
proposals to such committees not later than December 31
1
1982.
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response to this
paragraph, Schweiker
began to carefu,,
y
c oreograph the
events which insured
the enactment of
prospective
Payment.
Even before the
Schweiker Report was
submitted to the
"

legislatively designated
Congresional

committees, Schweiker
and the

staff at HHS began
canvassing the Hi,,,
sponsoring
breakfast information
sessions consulting
special

establishing

a

uncheon and

interest groups, and

system of co™,unication
to answer constituent's

ons regarding the plan.

were involved

l

According to several
HCFA staff

who

the preliminary efforts
to obtain support
for
Prospective payment, key actors
began to endorse the
proposal plan
o
to reading the actual
P
administrative report.
in

Carolyne Davis

reported that "Schweiker made
it

(adoption of prospective
payment,

possible" by paving the way
for the proposal. 2
As the staff in the Office
of Research and
Demonstrations

(ORD)

made minor alterations on their
previously devised plan for
national
implementation of prospective payment,
legislative staff at HCFA began

polling Congressmen

s

reaction to the concept

in

September 1982. The

staff met with members of the six
committees within the House and

Senate primarily involved
committees

in

the House were:

in

health policy legislation.

The

Ways and Means, Energy and Commerce,

and Appropriations; and Senate
Committees on Finance, Labor and Human

Resources, and Appropriations.

efforts were outlined

in

a

Some of the results of the HCFA staff

memo from Thomas Donnelly, Assistant for

Legislation, Health and Human Services, to Richard
Schweiker.

According to Donnelly, the general reaction of Congressional

staff was neutral with nearly all of the staff requesting
more
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^

and analysis of data
on the proposed
prospective
(PPS) 35 S0 ° n

"

P ° SSlble -

Committee was supportive.

^

The -action of the
Senate Finance

Finance Committee
staffers voiced specific
requests and concerns,
the most common of
which was the request
for a
phase-in period for
implementation of
pps
ur a ppb.
iwn concern of the
Another

Finance Committee staff
was that although
adoption of
Medicare patients would
control recipients

a

PPS for

health costs it may
simultaneously raise the
hospital costs to non-Medicare
recipients and
thus merely shift the
burden rather than solving
the problem of rising
health care costs.
Because of the problem with
cost shifting, a few

staff recommended an all
-payer system which would
regulate cost of
hospitalizations for everyone. The
Finance Committee staff
had
reservations also about the broad
discretion given to the Secretary
to
update rate schedules. Moreover,
some staff were worried
about the

PPS may have on public and
financially distressed hospitals.
Requests were made by the staff for
the inclusion of
process and
the system.

a

provision that would call for

a

a

rate appeal

periodic reevaluation of

Finally, Donnelly indicated that
the staff was concerned

about equity return and the coverage
of bad debts under the
Administration's proposal.
Senate Labor and Human Resources Comnittee
staff, Donnelly noted,

knew very little about the PPS proposals.

The staff's major concerns,

when informed, were the potential for cost
-shifting to non-Medicare
recipients created by the proposal and the negative impact
have on the quality of health care.

a

PPS may
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>». worries,

eb«r„ S

™

saw a need for
the system.

a

iooooed

,

^
„

„

«„

, ppj
iUf)
more specific payment
rate and requested
more data on

There were aiso concerns
regarding the potentiai

cost-shifting created by
the propose,.

for

The House Ways and
Means staff

was additionally uneasy
about the future of
State rate setting
programs, which presently had
waivers that exempted
them from current

Medicare reimbursement
regulations.

And finally,

the staff voiced
some anxiety in that the
system might cause "gaming”
or tampering with
diagnoses to increase the

reimbursement amounts.

Donnelly reported

that the reaction of House
Energy and Commerce Committee
was similar.
Overall the key concerns
identified by Donnelly at the
end of the

week were:

(1)

the Hill

wanted more data on the research
at Yale

University on the development of
the DRGs

;

(2)

they wanted to know the

impact the system would likely
have on hospitals;

(3)

they wanted to

know how budget updating would be
accomplished; (4) they wanted to

know how cost-shifting would be
prevented; and

(5)

they wanted

information on how public hospitals would
be affected by the system. 3

Although there were

no

substantive changes made

in

the ORD

national prospective payment system, some
minor alterations were

incorporated to enhance the political feasibility
response to the data gathered by Donnelly.

For example,

description of DRGs and their development became
report.

of the proposal

an

a

in

detailed

addendum to the

Monitoring mechanisms that were devised to control potential

problems identified

by Congressmen

such as gaming, cost-shifting and

increased admissions were highlighted

in

the document.

Another
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adjustment was made to
address congressiona,
disquietude, about the
continuation of state initiated
expecimentai cost containment
projects.

Following informal polls
taken

by Donnelly and
briefing sessions

offered by Schweiker, other
HCFA staff, under
Schweiker's direction,
also measured Congressional
reactions to PPS. Patrice
Finstein’
Associate Administrator for
Policy at HCFA, Larry
O'Day, Director!
Bureau of Program Policy at
HCFA, and Thomas Antone,
Deputy Executive
Secretary of HHS similarily
sized up Congressional
response to PPS.
The "Key Congressmen" with
whom Finstein, O'Day, and
Antone spoke were
members of either the Senate
Finance Committee, House Ways
and Means
Committee, or House Energy and
Commerce Committee, the three
committees which could have jurisdiction
over legislation which might

emerge from the report.

In

a

memo dated November 18, 1982,
Patrice

Finstein summarized the attitudes of
key Congressmen toward PPS.

Senator David Durenberger

(

Republ ican-Minnesota

)

Chairman of the

Subcommittee on Health of the Finance
Committee thought the Adminis-

tration's PPS was
promptly enacted.

an

improvement on the current system and should
be

He envisioned

it

as

stop-gap measure until

a

an

even better system could be designed that
would address utilization as
well as service.

He also noted that

there was

a

need for financial

incentives for patients to choose less expensive health
care.

Senator Robert Dole (Republ ican-Kansas

)

Chairman of the Finance

Committee endorsed the Administration's PPS
the dollar amount could be identified for

a

and concurred that once

given service, the federal

government should prospectively pay that amount.

Dole also firmly
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believed, according to
-4.
Finstpin
stein, tha*
that hospitals
should be rewarded for
economic efficiency.

Representative Ron Wyden
(De m ocrat-0reg„„)
mem ber of the Subcommittee on Health and the
Environment of the Energy
and Commerce
Committee was one of the
strongest proponents for
P PS

Wyden called
PPS an approach to give
providers incentives to
reduce costs because

he

.

believed retrospective
reimbursement was the primary
factor

draining the Medicare Trust
Fund.

Representative Henry Waxman
(Democrat-Cal ifornia) Chairman
of the
Subcommittee on Health and the
Environment of the Energy and
Commerce

Committee stated that he had
advocated
Finstein reported that Waxman

's

a

PPS for

a

long

time.

major concern was the risk
of cost

shifting without additional reforms
or regulations.

Representative Bill Gradison (Republ
ican-Ohio) member of the

Committee on Ways and Means stated PPS

was a fundamental

may be able to help keep down health
care costs

in

change which

the long run.

Representative Edward Madigan (Republ
ican-Ill inois) member of the

Subcommittee on Health and the Environment of
the Energy and Commerce

Committee stated that although

he

favored PPS he was unable to

support any specific program at that time.

Representative Charles Rangel (Democrat-New York) member
of the
Subcommittee on Health of the Committee on Ways and Means preferred
statewide PPS, according to Finstein.

Rangel

preferred that

a

plan be

implemented whereby, HHS would approve an individual state's plan.

foresaw that the program could be operational within two years.

a

He

71

Representative Oa.es Jones
(Democrat-Oklahoma) member
commntee on Ways and Means and
James Martin

of the

(Republican-North

Carolina) member of the
Subcommittee on Health of the
Committee
Ways and Means did not
foresee the development
of

implemented nationwide.
individual

a

PPS that

on

could be

Therefore, both Jones and
Martin supported

state PPSs that could be
approved by the Secretary
of H HS.«

While HCFA staff polled the
Hill and ORD modified the
report
enhance it political feasibility.

public and special

to

Schweiker turned to the general

interests to engender their support.

At a press

conference on October 6, 1982
Schweiker formally unveiled the
Administration's proposal for prospective
payment.

He reviewed the

development of ORGs, the plan for national
implementation, and fielded

questions regarding the proposal. Later
with representatives of major special

in

the month, Schweiker met

interest groups

including the

American Hospital Association (AHA), the
Federation
Hospitals

(

FAH

)

,

the American Medical

Association

of American

(AMA),

Blue

Cross/Blue Shield (BC/BS) and the Health Insurance
Association
America (HIAA), to brief them on the details of the
plan and request

of
a

response to the plan from each organization. At the
same time, HCFA
set up

a

hot line to respond to questions any of the groups*

may raise.

for

Both major special

members

interests and Congress voiced support

the concept of prospective payment, but admonished

Administration
proposal

to move slowly

the

and carefully deliberate over the

prior to taking steps toward its legislative adoption.^

Despite the informal polling and dissemination of information

by

HCFA staff on the Hill, enactment of prospective payment did not, at
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least to some

professional
uicbbionai
h

In the latter half

-m
mil
h

observers

of November 1982,

a

"

annoa^ to be
appear
imminent.

National

.

Journal

unda

article by

Oemov itch reported that
the Administration's
prospective payment
proposal would not be readily
adopted.
According to Demovitch.
the

proposed PPS could be

an

effective TO ans of cost
containment, but it

would be several years
before prospective
payment would become
national health policy.^

a

By early December it
began to appear that
Demovitch's prediction
was incorrect.
In response to growing
support for the Administra-

tion's proposal. Representative
Edward Madigan (Republ lean
-111 inois
became concerned that legislative
adoption of prospective
payment may
be in the offing. HCFA staff
reported that other members of
the Senate
Finance and House Ways and Means

Committees verbalized concerns

similar to Madigan's as momentum
grew for enactment of prospective
payment, but only Madigan wrote of
his unease.
Because the

correspondence reflects general sentiments

and

is

the only primary

source of information prior to submission
of the Schweiker Report, its
contents and Schweiker

's

response are noteworthy.

One of the issues raised by Madigan was the
degree of statistical

accuracy

in

the Administration's proposal.

Madigan was also concerned

about the potential created by the proposal for
hospital

skimming by

increasing the volume of low intensity cases or by the refusal
of
private hospitals to care for public patients.

addressed

by

Madigan was the absence of

Another
a

device

problem
in

the

Administration's proposal to control the incentive rates, which
according to Madigan, may lead

to an

unfair reward system.

Madigan
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was also worried
about the complexity
of the cost reporting
system
whKh would be necessary for
every hospital to
possess for successful

implementation of the
Administration's proposal.

Madigan, like many
other Congressmen, was
distressed about the
system's potential for
cost-shifting and increased
admission rates.
Another potential

problem addressed by Madigan
was the possibility of
DRG creep or
fudging a diagnosis in order
to classify
a patient

in

a higher

DRG

category.

Along with these concerns,
Madigan feared that enactment
of
the Administration's PPS
would obliterate efforts
to develop a better
PPS.

In

conclusion. Madigan endorsed the
concept of PPS, but urged

Schweiker to study the proposal
further and delay its enactment
for at
least a yea rj

Schweiker immediately responded

to Madigan

delineating the

mechanisms within the proposal that
addressed the issues he raised.
In

relation to the statistical accuracy,
Schweiker reminded Madigan

that

the DRG model was over ten years
old and had been carefully

researched prior to its successful
implementation as
reimbursement mechanism in New Jersey.

In

statewide

reference to Madigan

concern regarding the proposal's potential
for
replied that the Administration's proposal

mechanism that would identify

a

's

skirmiing, Schweiker

included

a

monitoring

the number of admissions and the

diagnoses of each hospital's Medicare patients.

Monitoring could also

discover hospitals that were skimming or admitting only
profitable
DRGs and eliminate DRG creep or classification of patients in a higher

DRG than

appropriate to increase hospital reimbursement

.

To Madigan

's

distress regarding the lack of incentive controls Schweiker responded
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physicians wi, lhave

s

ome control over
th1s 1ssue 1n th , t

physicians will not drastically
cut costs or care
to avoid malpractice

litigation.

Schwei

er

also pointed out to
Madigan that the
Administration's proposal
included a five percent
incentive cap to
prevent excessive hospital
profits.
k

In response to the
issue of the

complexity of the system,
Schweiker indicated that
the system would be
less complex than the
retrospective system and
reminded Madigan

an

that
the necessary information
for reimbursement is
on the patients'

discharge summaries.

Regarding cost -shifting,
Schweiker stated the

situation would be monitored and
that this was more of

other third party payers.

a

problem for

In reference to future
research,

reminded Madigan that there were
still

several

Schweiker

states with Medicare

waivers experimenting with alternative
prospective payment systems.
In

conclusion, Schweiker thanked Madigan
for expressing his concerns

and encouraged him to support the
Administration's proposal 8 Because
.

of Madigan

's

letter, the mechanisms designed to
control

impacts were even more clearly described
before it was submitted later that month

in

negative

the Schweiker Report

9
.

The effort to canvass Congress, conduct
informal polls prior to

submission of the proposal

to

the designated

disseminate information to interest groups

was

committees, and
crucial

in

building

consensus for the resultant legislation. Schweiker's
history as

Senator enhanced his effectiveness

in

a

this role and the effort itself

undoubtedly reflected his Congressional experience. The results of

Schweiker's effort to soften up members of the Senate Finance

and

House Ways and Means Committee and interest groups prior to submission
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the Administration's
proposal was evidenced
by the supportive
estimony at subsequent
prospective parent
hearings in the Spring
ongressi onal staff
reported that consensus
buiiding and softening
up
also made the eventual
attachment of the bin
to other legislation
more palatable.

The report reached the
designated Congressional
members by the
legislated deadline, December
ecemoer 31, iqa?
1982.
It a
described the development
and demonstration of
DRGs, explained the
resource utilization TO
asure^nt assoc1ated «ith each DRG, and
addressed the major concerns
that
had emerged from Congress
during the previous months
of canvassing.
,

Committee Hearings

Committee hearings regarding the
Hospital Prospective Payment
proposal

in

the Schweiker Report were
scheduled for February of
1983.

The hearings were to elicit
reactions to the PPS plan based
on the DRG

model designated

in

the Schweiker Report.

The interest groups invited

to testify included the AHA,
the FAH, the AMA, and the
Association of

American Medical Colleges (AAMC

)

.

Their endorsement would be

necessary for subsequent adoption of
the proposal

in

the form of

legislation by Congress.

When Congressional hearings on the Medicare
prospective payment
system began, nearly all key actors were facing
circumstances that
rendered them amenable to change
system.

in

the present Medicare reimbursement

Because the conditions which engendered support from key

actors were unique to each group, they will be reviewed

with

testimony provided at Congressional

in

conjunction

hearings.

The
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Administration's proposal
Dronncai also
gamed the endorsement of
because of its specific
design
ea cures
features
y

,

key actors

which were perceived
as an

improvement over retrospective
cost reimbursement.

The relationship
between the significance
of the problem and the
appeal of the policy
although different for
each actor, generated
the support necessary
for
the enactment of a

prospective payment system
for Medicare.

example, the endorsement
from the hospital

industry emerged because
of

the inclusion of incentives
which allowed hospitals
to retain all

funds that were allocated
for
W5S provided at

The

in

specific diagnosis

if

the

the treatment

lower cost.

key actors

legislation

HCFA,

a

a

For

in

the

enactment of prospective
payment

the spring of 1983,

included:

Schweiker and the staff

the Senate Finance Committee
and the House Ways and Means

Committee and their respective
Subcommittee on Health; the hospital

industry represented by the FAH, the
AHA,

and the Catholic Hospital

Association (CHA); the medical profession
represented by the AMA and
the AAMC; the insurance industry
represented by the Health Insurance

Association of America (HIAA) and Blue
Cross/Blue Shield

Medicare recipients who were represented

(BC/BS)

by the Gray Panthers,

the

American Association of Retired Persons (AARP),
and the National
Council of Senior Citizens

(NCSC); and the American Medical

Records

Association (AMRA).

The Subcommittee on Health of the Senate Finance Comnittee
held
hearings on February 1-3, 1983, and again on February 17, 1983.

The

Subcommittee on Health of the House Ways and Means Committee conducted

hearings on February 14 and

15

,

1983.

The general

mood of the
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testimony was supportive
with nearly every
group endorsing the

proposal

and recommending
minor alternations
in the

Administration's

plan

Richard Schweiker provided
the first testimony.
presentation by indicating

He began his

the need for a
mechanism that would
contain

rising health care costs.
explanation of DRGs.

C o„cl

He

followed this with

^^

usio „, Schweiker encouraged

...

~
Of 4-U
the coimiittee to support
his proposed PPS. 10

rs-C

The Administration's
impetus

detailed

a

for the enactment of
prospective

payment primarily stemmed
from rapidly rising Medicare
expenditures
and budgetary constraints
due to decreased revenues
and

economy.

with

a

In 1982

.

a

stagnating

reimbursement for Medicare
increased $33.4 billion

projected increase of $50.4
billion by 1985, if cost

containment legislation was not
enacted

11
.

The Social

Security Trust

Fund appeared to be on the verge
of bankruptcy and reduction
of
benefits was not perceived to be

a

politically feasible solution.

The

Medicare Hospital Insurance Trust Fund
had borrowed $12 billion from
the Social Security Trust Fund which
it could

the economic woes of the entire
program.

not repay, exacerbating

Federal

declining as the Medicare expenditures increased.

revenues were
In an

attempt to

bolster the economy in 1981, the Economic
Recovery Tax Act was passed

decreasing federal revenues

by $104 million with a projected

decrease of $267 ,627 million by 1986.

111

revenue

Along with rising Medicare

costs and declining revenue, the country showed signs
of economic
stagnation.

In

December 1982, the federal deficit had risen to

a
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record high of
1.201 ,898 million dollars,
une^loyment was at 10.7

percent, and the inflation
rate was approximately
four percent. 13
Along with economic
issues which influenced
Schweiker's position,
pport for prospective
payment was also
motivated by a personal
action to insure its enactment.
The personal reasons
included his
desire to make amends for
what he referred to
as his embarrassment
because he supported voluntary
cost containment as
a Senator in i
979 .
He also believed that
prospective payment could
alleviate the problem
of escalating national
health expenditures without
jeopardizing the
quality of care.^

The

concern of the Senate Finance
and House Ways

and Means
Committee members regarding the
plight of the Medicare
program and the
Social Security Trust Fund is
evidenced by statements made
by their
members at Committee hearings
addressing prospective payment
for

hospitalizations

of Medicare recipients.

At the Senate Finance

Committee's Subcommittee on Health
hearings on prospective payment,
David Durenberger ( Republ ican
-Minnesota

the future of Medicare and the

system due

to cost -based

"mess"

reimbursement.

stated he was worried about

)

in

the health care delivery

Durenberger went on to state

that retrospective reimbursement had
encouraged hospitals to be

inefficient and spend more money because whatever
reimbursed.

was

This retrospective cost-based reimbursement system
led to

rapidly rising health care costs, excessive
outlays
inefficiency

spent would be

in

for capital, and

the health care delivery system.

Durenburger stated further that prospective payment could save
Medicare and increase efficiency

in

the health care delivery system

79
h

r

"
^

,i *

$eni0r CltlZenS

DUrenber 9er

'

S

initi

"

...

and "g° od

-

the country. "15
Although
to support .
means of cost .

contact

was the problem of
escalating health care
cost, he would
have been unwilling
to quickly adopt
prospective parent, if
there had
been a sig„if 1M nt outcry
against the proposal,
according to one of
his staff. 16

senator Max Baucas, another
member of the Finance
Committee
(Democrat-Montana) stated that
there was

a

problem with Medicare’s

cost -based reimbursement
which led to uncontrollable
health care cost
inflation.
He praised prospective
payment as a realistic
solution,
which could contain health
care costs and therefore
stabilize the

Medicare program while maintaining
the present distribution
of
benefits.
Baucas believed that
it

was necessary for Congress
to

address the problem of rising
Medicare expenditures, but his
support
of the Administration's policy
was related to the fact that
the DRGbased model of prospective
reimbursement was technically feasible
and

acceptable to other key actors according

to Senate Finance Conmittee

staff. 17

Robert Dole (Republ ican -Kansas

)

chair of the Senate Finance

Committee noted that preserving the
financially unstable Medicare

program was

a

major problem for the 98th Congress.

Dole encouraged

Senate Finance Committee members to endorse
prospective payment as

a

means of controlling rising health care costs without
limiting
available hospitalization benefits. 18
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Russell Long (Democrat-Louisiana)
believed that Congress
was faced with the problem
of rising Medicare
expenditures which could
lead to the insolvency
of the entire Social
Security System.
According to Long, retrospective

reimbursement rewarded expensive

inefficient health care because
those hospitals that spent
more money
received more Medicare dollars
regardless of the quality care
provided
by the institution.
Long stated that he endorsed
prospective payment
as a means of controlling

rising health care costs and
that

it

would

also reward hospitals that could
efficiently provide care.

According

to HCFA staff. Long supported
the Administration's proposal

primarily

because

appeared to be

it

a

technically feasible instrument for

containing Medicare costs and stabilizing
the fiscal status of Social

Security. 19 As heavyweight Senators on
the Finance Committee, the
position of Durenberger, Baucus, Dole and
Long were quite influential
in

the generation of support for the proposal
from other committee

members

2^
,

At the House Ways and Means Committee hearing,

held later

February, 1983 the mood of the members was similar
to that

Senate Finance Corrmittee.

At hearings on Social

in

in

the

Security Reform, the

context in which PPS was introduced to Ways and Means, Daniel
Rostenk owsk

i

(Democrat-11

1

inois

)

pleaded with comnittee members to

"put Social Security back on firm footing."

Gradison

(

Republ

i

can -Ohi

o

)

21

In the same vein,

Willis

stated his concern regarding the $12

billion debt which had been incurred by the Social

Trust Fund for the Medicare program.

22

Security Hospital

Gradison encouraged comnittee
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^

eqUlt * ble •"«

d"

solution to the fiscal

problems of Medicare.

Henson Moore

,

Reput, i can-Louisi ana

supported the prospective
payment proposal stating
without it. Congress
would be forced to
face
nore unappealing choices
in the future
such as a decrease
in Medicare
benefits or an increase
in taxes to
maintain the current
level of

benefits.

^

,

Andrew Jacobs (Democrat-Indiana)
echoed the concerns of

Moore, as he reminded the
committee ambers of the
fiscal constraints
they were facing and pleaded
with the committee to
find a solution to
uncontrollable rising health care
expenditures. 24

The Senate Finance and
House Ways and Means Committee
members
were motivated to act because
of rising Medicare
expenditures, which
were threatening the financial
stability
of the entire Social

System.

Security
The 1982 Congressional elections
emphasized the problem, and

further, Schweiker's lobbying
campaign
positive effect.

in

the fall of 1982 also had
a

Once motivated to act, the
Committees willingness to

support rapid action stemmed from

a

previous failed attempt to enact

cost containment legislation during
the Carter Administration.

defeated because

it

was

"nibbled to death" during

a

long

It

was

tedious

process of adoption. 25

The hospital
Schweiker formula.
hearings.

position

Michael
in

industry association took the lead

in

backing the

The FAH and AHA represented the industry at
the
Bromberg President of the FAH, summarized the FAH's

the following statement:

We (FAH) felt last year and still feel that the most
important provision in TEFRA was the mandating of the
Secretary to develop a prospective proposal by the end of
the year.
And now that that proposal has been submitted to
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° ne and urge you
adopt it with
to
recommended changes!^" 9

™'

S

trates

Chan9eS

^cific

proposal such as a reguest
for

aspects of the Adminis-

provision for states to
develop their own systems,
hut overall the
association was supportive
Alexander McMahon, President
of the AHA, assured
the Committee
that prospective payment
had the organizations
a

backing:

the‘key
1*
S'
s t,me to move
and we will do all we ran
b1e
compromise between the
competing interest 'that
change
incentives, but that will bring
us all
„„tt„
n
a
ut to where
want us to be, which is a
y° u all
?
rate ° fI ,ncrease in
l»*Pltal
costs in the ^ars ahead^

"

wilwT

-n,
problems that

3

pusicive response was related

to the

was facing and the design
of the proposed prospective

it

payment system.

The

industry's problems stemned from
the fact that

the demise of the Medicare
program would destroy the largest
purchaser
of health care.
The passage of TEFRA heightened
the hospital industry

awareness of the severity of the problem.

Under TEFRA,

a

ceiling was placed

on

hospitalization

reimbursement rates for Medicare, which were
to be lowered for each

year until

1986

,

at which

point the rate would be fixed.

Within

a

year after TEFRA was passed, hospitals began
to realize the negative

impact of its budgetary limitations leading both
the FAH and AHA to
encourage committee members to adopt

any flaws

in

an

alternative to TEFRA despite

the Administration's proposal.

this position when he observed:

Bromberg clearly stated
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one we

,e

" 0t necessari
wouirhave^ecommende^'if
ly the
can support,
we bel -ve it is clear,;
Merabi? to the existing
sy1tem>
1

cHahon also addressed
the constraints
TEFRA had placed on

ospi tal s,

careful

"Our support is the
result of more than
two years of
study of the effects on
hospitals of steadily
worsening

payment shortfalls under
traditional
reimbursement

retrospective cost-based

1,29
.

The hospital

industry may have been
unwilling to support the

prospective payment policy simply
to alleviate the
burden imposed by
TEFRA, if the policy had
not been carefully
formulated.
Schweiker

included the industry

earliest stages

of

in

the policy development
process from the

consideration.

Michael Bromberg worked with

Carolyne Davis to insure acceptance

by

the FAN and Schweiker's

relationship with Jack Owens enhanced
communication between

the

Administration and the AHA so that
the support of both associations
could be elicited prior to the
submission of the Schweiker Report
to

the appropriate congressional
committees.

Moreover,

the

policy,

included

efficient hospital administration.

patient at

a

could retain

a

mechanism that would reward

If a hospital

provided care to

lower cost than was designated by the
DRG
the difference.

Another association of the hospital
at

the hospital

This aspect of prospective payment

undoubtedly enhanced its appeal to the hospital

provide testimony

,

a

industry.

industry, the CHA, did not

prospective payment hearings.

Despite its

absence, Paul Retting, Chief of Staff of the Subcommittee on Health
of
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lt
the members of the
CHA were not Tac
facina
1
g the same fiscal
constraints that plagued
the AHA because
members of CHA received
funds
°" ° hUrCh affilUted
«ch as the Catholic Stewardship
Retting also reported
that the appeal of
incentives which engendered
the FAH's support was
not as strong a TOt
ivator for the CHA,
because
its members were church
affiliated and non -prof
i t .30
The d1m1n1shed

ettmg,

significance of financial
problems for the CHA
curtailed

its support

for the proposal.

Although the CHA was less
enthusiastic than the AHA
and FAH, Schweiker and
the staff at HCFA worked
closely with the CHA's

representative, John Thompson of
Yale University, and
Schweiker was
able to elicit the association's
support by incl uding a four
year
phase-in period for the prospective
payment system. With the three
major hospital industry
associations supporting prospective
payment,
the momentum began to build
for enactment.

Despite growing acceptance, the
AAMC was one association that
did
not jump on the bandwagon and
actively support the Administration's

prospective payment proposal.

John Cooper representing the AAMC

stated:

While the AAMC recorrmends that the payment
limits enacted in
the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility
Act of 1982 be
replaced with a prospective payment system for
hospitals,
the defects and weaknesses in the HHS
proposal are

serious,
questions of equity and assume hospitals
have essentially homogeneous products. ^

raise substantial

When reviewing the position taken by the AAMC,

keep

in

mind several factors.

First,

it

is

important to

hospitalization reimbursement
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^nations

le9l$lated

1n

TEFRA

apply to ph y Sician
e!m ursement rates,
which were still
set according to
reasonable
costs and the funds
allocated for medical
education under TEFRA
were
not significantly
limited. Another farfr,
„
u
actor which
influenced the
position of the hospital
industry; the potential
bankruptcy of the
Social Security System
and Hospital Insurance
Trust Fund, had
.

•

far less

-Pact

on

the medical

profession because only
20 percent of funds

expended by the Medicare
program were allocated
to physician
reimbursement^ Therefore, the AA1C
had a

diminished perception of

the problem of rising care
costs.

Lack of understanding
or input into

the formulation of the
proposal was not

a

reason to oppose because
the

AAMC had been represented by
James Bentley on the
Prospective Payment
Task Force formed by Carolyne
Davis in 1981.
Despite that fact, the

association was not as enamored
with the proposal as the
hospital

industry.

Efforts to bring them around
began shortly after their

testimony.

The amount of funds allocated
to hospitals for medical

education under TEFRA remained the same
prospective payment proposal.

in

the Administration's

During the first weeks of Congressional

hearings, executive and Congressional
staff negotiated with the AAMC
and doubled the amount of funds
allocated

education

in

in

TEFRA for medical

the prospective payment proposal.

Although the AAMC

subsequently did not support the Administration's
proposal, they did
not openly oppose it either, which given their
prestige within the

industry and the profession, justified the effort
previously mentioned negotiations.

put

into the
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The AMA, represented
by Jerald Schenken
„ ke the AMAC, toot
posi tion of studied
neutrality. The lack
of support

a

or opposition
from the AMA stems from
the fact that
physicians were not directly

affected by TEFRA or the
proposed prospective
payment system.
Had
they been, it seems
likely
oh
y the oolit-irai
tical
P
terrain would have been
much
rockier.
Yet

to be

heard from, and likely
to carry great weight,
was the

insurance industry.

Cross/Blue Shield

Much to the relief of
the Administration.
Blue
and the Health Insurance
Association of America

supported the proposal, but both
requested

an

all-payer system rather

than one merely for Medicare
recipients. 33 According to Paul
Rettig,
the insurance industry did not
enthusiastically support prospective
payment because it would be to its
advantage

if

Medicare benefits were

decreased or even terminated and senior
citizens needed more coverage

from private sources; but the
industry did not openly oppose the
Administration's proposal because by the
time the industry provided

testimony, bandwaggoning was so prevalent
that the industry did not
want to be left out. 34
A

group most directly affected by the prospective
payment system

was, of course. Medicare recipients.

They were represented at the

hearings by the Gray Panthers, the AARP, and
the NCSC.

The Gray

Panthers, position was presented by Frances Klafter, who
praised the

concept of prospective payment
ills.

cure for the health care system's

a

On the other hand, Klafter did

potential
system

as

in

for the development of

a

indicate concern regarding the

two-tiered health care delivery

which Medicare recipients received one standard of care and

^
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allots

patients received hi gher
guaHty care unless

prospective payment rates were
appi ied to

fear, Klafter encouraged

all

payers.

^

Because of this

legislators to move slowly
and consider

alternative prospective payment
systems. 35
AARP, represented by Jack
Christy, pointed out
that hospital cost
containment was one of the
organization's highest
priorities because

rising hospital

costs were responsible for
the present fiscal

instability of Medicare's Hospital

Insurance Trust Fund.

AARP was

supportive of the Administration's
proposal, but cautioned committee
members not to rush the policy
"along on

a

fast track." 36

Jacob dayman, President of the
NCSC, indicated the association
supported the Administration's proposal
as

from financial insolvency.

In his

an

attempt to save Medicare

statement, dayman hinted that the

organization would not oppose the attachment
of the prospective
payment proposal to the Social Security Reform
Package because of the

serious need for hospital cost containment
which dayman believed was

necessary to salvage the Medicare program.

37

Although none of the

consumer organizations appear to be particularly
enamored with the

Administration

s

proposal, the impact of which they questioned, their

acceptance was primarily motivated by the realization of the
problem
of Social

Security financing which they believed could lead

to the

demise of the entire Medicare program.

Finally,

the association representing medical

records personnel,

who would be responsible for the records which indicated the diagnosis
of the

patients upon discharge, testified.

perceived as

a

Although the AMRA was not

significant lobbying force, the testimony from the

88

association was

-ch

an

important indication
of the potential
difficulties

.i 9ht occun if th
e

Medical

proposal

_

^^

1mplemented>

Records at Overlook
Hospital

in

Sum.it, New Jersey

emphasized that the DRG
model of Pprospective
uspective payment had
been
successfully implemented
in New
Jerspv
a
w Jersey.
According
to Simons, the
,

.

system was so well developed
that it did not increase
the workload of
medical records personnel.
At the
conclusion of her testimony,
Simons

encouraged committee members
to adopt the proposal

assistance of the AMRA

in

and offered the

refining the system,
particularly since by

the time Simons was heard
on February 15, 1983 in
the House Ways and
Means Committee and on February
17, 1983 in the Senate Finance,
both
committees were "considering a
fast track," for legislation. 38

Schweiker was unable

to attend the prospective
payment hearings

before the Subcommittee on Health
of the House Ways and
Means
Committee on February 13, l 983 because
he had resigned from his
post

nearly two weeks earlier to become
President of the Health Insurance

Association

of America.

In

lieu of the opportunity to testify
there,

he did present the Administration's
prospective payment

proposal

at

the House Ways and Mean's hearings on
Social Security Reform on
February 3, 1983 his last day

in

office.

At that

time Schweiker hoped

that the Corrmittee would consider attaching
prospective payment to the

Social Security Amendments of 1983 (SSA),

which were

in

the offing.

The SSA that year, unlike customary practices of
consideration, were
unique

in

that without their swift enactment the entire program
faced

bankruptcy and the primary source of the crisis

was Medicare

89

expenditures.

The response to

Schweiz

testimony was oeutra,
with
on y a few questions
posed regarding the
details of the policy.^
An additional

remittee,

the Special

Comnittee on Aging,
at the proposed PPS
at a hearing on
February 4 , 1983
.

however, focused on
testimony regarding deaths
due
Texas nursing home.

As a

opted

The hearing,

to negligence

in

a

Because the deceased
were Medicare recipients,

the committee addressed
program.

,

the

issue of the quality
of care under this

"potential" alteration

in

the Medicare system,
PPS was
discussed in terms of any
affects it may have on
the quality of health

care to senior citizens.

PPS was a secondary
topic at the hearings
and was only briefly
reviewed. 40

Voting Results in Senate
Fina nce
and House Ways and Means
CommitTee

Following their hearings, the
respective Subcomni ttees marked
-up
the Administration's proposal.
At that point, each
Subcommittee
forwarded their revised prospective
payment plant to the full Senate

Finance and House Ways and Means
Committees.

The contents of the

Bills reflected each branches'
perception of political feasibility
of
prospective payment.

Because Representatives have

a

more significant

degree of constituent dependency than their
counterparts
Senate, House Bill
Bill

1.

in

the

1900 contained more liberal guidelines than
Senate

For example,

both the Senate and the House Bills increased

the Administratively designated percentage of
reimbursemen

t

for

outliers, but unlike the Senate, the House version did not
place any
cap on the total

allocations

a

hospital could claim as outlier costs.
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The ch fferentiat ion
between urban versus
rural hospitals
(absent
e

Arbitration proposal, reflects

-presentation by

subcode*

metropolitan areas.

House based

its

In

in

the dominance of
urban

members, ros t of who.
were fro. lar ge

accordance with its
openhanded

ideology, the

guidelines on nine versus
the Senate's four
census

track divisions, opti.izing
each hospitals
rei.burse.ent potential
The House version
called for a four year
phase-in period while the
Senate advocated a three
year settling-in time.
Both the House and

Senate requested that the
Administration incorporate
a severity-ofillness index in its proposal
to insure efficient
and equitable
implementation of prospective
payment,

TOre detailed description
of
the proposals and the
subsequent compromises will
be examined in
fl

review of the Conference
Committee Report. Both Committees
concluded
that prospective payment would
be an addendum to the
SSA of 1983.

According to Ways and Means

Corrmittee staff,

the plan to attach

PPS to the Social Security
Amendments of 1983 was discussed

early part of February, 1983.

At

a

41

in

the

meeting attended by staff from the

House Committee on Ways and Means and
its Subcommittee on Health,

staff from HCFA, John Salmon, Chief
Council for the Ways

and

and Means

Committee, who had taken on the role of
policy entrepreneur following

Schweiker's resignation, announced that PPS would
if

the

be attached

to SSA

legislation could be drafted within the next three
weeks.

According to informed sources,
and effective action.

A

it appeared

the time was ripe for quick

window of opportunity existed and Salmon

intended to take advantage by attaching the prospective payment
proposal to the 1983 Social Security Amendments. 4 ^
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According

to Salmon,

his

impetus for piacing
prospective pa y «„t

on the "fast tract"
emerged for several reasons,
one of which was that
he had witnessed the
defeat of Carter's cost
-contains efforts
in

1977-1979 and wanted to avoid

payment.

a

simiiar outcome for
prospective

Another rationale cited

by Salmon for

attachment of

Prospective payment to the
Social Security Amendments
was that due to
the early lobbying efforts
of Schweiker and his
staff and the growing
distress regarding the financial
insolvency of Social Security,
there
was

a

ground swell of support for
the strategy.

These factors coupled

with endorsement of the tactic
by Representative
Daniel Rostenkowski
Democ rat - 1
ino i s
Chairman of Ways and Means,
motivated Salmon to
(

1

1

)

,

pursue swift adoption of prospective
payment. 43 The Administration
and
members of the House Cormnttee on
Ways and Means and the Subcormittee
on Health worked together to draft
the bill (H.

R.

1900).

The Ways and

Means Committee was the only House
Committee involved
development.

in

its

There was some controversy surrounding
this decision

when Representative Henry Waxman (Democrat-Cal

if ornia

)

requested that

the Subcommittee on Health of the Energy
and Interstate Commerce

Committee, of which he was chair, review the proposal
before
to the floor of the House.

it went

Because the bill only affected hospitals'

in-patient services for Medicare recipients, the Comnittee
on Ways and
Means was able to maintain

placement as

an

sole control

attachment to the SSA

over the bill
in

prior to its

the Committee meeting on

March 4, 1983. 44 It was evident that Medicare was not part of the

Energy and Commerce Committee's jurisdiction and therefore, the
Speaker of the House would have surely upheld

a

recommendation of the
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rtliM

m

one of his staff, was
the fact that there
was general acceptance
of
the prospective payment
proposal in the House
and from special
interest groups.
Consequently, Waxman did
not perceive a need
for him
to advocate a position
contrary to the proposal
being taken by the
Ways and Means Corrmittee. 45

The

individual

who

"hammered out" the Senate's
analogous

legislative package was Sheila
Burke, Assistant to the
Senate Majority

Leader.

In conjunction with Salmon,

she worked with

Subcommittee on Health of the
Finance Committee as

version of prospective payment
(Senate

Bill

i)

,

it

the Senate

developed its

which was attached to

the Social Security Amendments
by the Senate Finance
Committee on

March

3

,

1983.

The fact that Schweiker had
left the Senate less than

two years prior to the hearings on
prospective payment enhanced his

credibility with his former colleagues
when
as Secretary of HHS.

involved

in

counterparts

in

the

he testified before them

Consequently, Senate staff were less
intimately

adoption of prospective payment than
their

House. 46

Once both Cormittees agreed to attach prospective
payment to the
amendments, it became known as Title VI and was thereafter
heard only
in

closed hearings.

47

According to Rettig, once the decision to attach

the prospective payment proposal

been made,

the proposal

to the Social Security Amendments had

developed

a

"full

passage took on an image of "inevitability,

..

48

head of steam"

and its
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Following its attachment
to thee Social
or
+
„
social cSecurity
Amendments,
prospective payment became
a pare
part of
or thp
0^ i +
the legislative
agenda to be
addressed by Congress-as
-

•

i

-a-whol

e

*

Staff nn
staff
on hnth
both uHouse and Senate

Committees observed that ac t-i+i^ \/t
as Title VI of the
Amendments, the PPS was

perceived by congressmen
as

a

"little southing tacked
on to Social

Security" that was
noncontroversial and appeared
to be an effective
mechanism for the containment
of rising federal
health care
9
expenditures / Under these
circumstances, success appeared
to be
guaranteed

The Social

Security Amendments, following
three days of closed

hearings were received
the House calendar.
by

14,

a

the House on March
14,

in

On March 23, 1983 the Bill

243 to 102 margin.

H.R. 1900 was received

1983 and placed on the Senate calendar.

passed by

a

roll

call

vote of 88 yeas and

9

1983 and placed on

(H.R. 1900) was passed

the Senate on March

in

On March 23, 1983

nays.

it was

5^

Conference Report

Because the House and Senate bills differed
aspects,

a

conference committee was formed.

In

23, 1983, which was described by a HCFA staff as

differences were resolved.

51

’

52

in

significant

conference on March

a

a

"free-for-all," the

The major issues that created

obstacles between the House and Senate,

as

earlier stated were

outliers, the urban/rural split, regionalism and the lack

severity of illness index
were reflected

in

in

the system.

of

a

The results of the sessions

the conference amendments. 52
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0

U

reference to outliprs

" qUe

P ° Siti0nS

re9ardin 9

the proportion of
total DRG

-tilers;

and

,3,

•

y

the
the Adml "i5tration,
Senate, and House

(0

the definition of
an outlier;

reimburse^

defined as "atypical

2)

that would be expended
for

to the Administration's
proposal,

outliers were

cases" that could not
exceed more than one

percent of reported cases,
and would
determined by the Secretary
of HHS.

be

reimbursed at

an

rate

undetermined number over

length of stay or standard
deviation

whichever was less.

a

half

The Senate bill defined
outliers

clients whose length of stay
exceeds

the mean

,

the means of determining
the reimbursement
rate for

According

a

,

from that mean,

The proportion of total
cases that could be

reimbursed under the Senate's bill
was set at not less than
five
percent, but not over six percent.

The rate of reimbursement in
the

Senate's bill was to be determined
by the Secretary of
HHS based on
approximated marginal costs.
The House bill defined outliers
as cases
which exceeded the DRG designated
length of stay by over thirty
days
and

limited the proportion of possible outliers

percent of all cases.

to not less than

four

The Secretary of HHS was to determine
the rate

of outlier reimbursement

The conference amendment followed the Senate's
bill
areas, definition,

total

in

all

three

proportion of reimbursement allocated to

outliers, and reimbursement rate-setting.

The Senate's amendment was

selected, as reported by informed staff, because

it

had

the highest

degree of technical feasibility of the three proposals.

There was also controversy regarding the urban/rural reimburse-

ment adjustments.

The Administration's proposal did not contain

a
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—

differentiating urban
'’I'

addreSS6d

^

diff

f rom rural

hospitals.

“^an

The Senate,

and rural hospitals
by
separate rates of payments
to urban and rural
the four census regions.
The House bill, on the
other hand, app, ied

apply

mg

^^

^

separate parent rates
to urban and rurai
areas based on the nine
census divisions.

because

it

The conference agreement
followed the House bill

more clearly delineated
the rei.burse.ent
trends of each

section of the country.

Similar controversy, emerged
regarding the issue of regional
reimbursement adjustments during
PPS's phase-in period.
The
Administration's proposal did not
A

contain

issue.

The Senate bill required regional

a

provision addressing the

reimbursement adjustments

based on the four census regions
which would no longer appl
y after the
third year of implementation.
The House bill required regional

reimbursement adjustments based on the
nine census divisions which
would no longer apply after the fourth
year of implementation.

compromise the conference agreed

to base the regional

As a

reimbursement

modifications on the nine census divisions,
but the adjustment would
no

longer apply after the third year of
implementation of the system.

The final major obstacle facing conferees
was the determination
of

a

mechanism that would address the perceived lack of

illness

index

in

the Administration's proposal.

a

severity-of-

The Administration's

proposal did not contain a specific severity-of-illness
index, because
it

The

believed that that measurement was inherent

in

the design of DRGs.

Senate and House bills contained similar provisions that

indirectly addressed the issue.

The conference agreed to maintain
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Pe 1mental $tate

;eve ;op

programs, which may
eventually
a

useful severity-of-i,i
ne ss Index and to
establish

experts that would
conduct studies

a

panel

of

and

issue reports on the
effects
the prospective
payment system based
on DRGs had on
hospitals
Medicare recipients, and
health care expenditures.

Other less controversial
details regarding the
Administration of
prospective payment were
also address*! by the
conference committee.

Sellar impetus

to contain rising
Medicare expenditures
without

jeopardizing the quality of
care motivated Congress
Administration to develop

both.

a

and

the

legislative package that
was acceptable to

Consequently, the Conference
Report was not drastically

different from the Administration's
proposal.

Specific regulations

such as the definition and
reimbursement rates for outliers
and
delineation of geographic regions
did not affect the basic
premise of

prospectively determining
diagnosis.

a

resource allocation for any given

Also, because the system was
budget neutral, revenues for

increased allocations

in

expenditures for another.

one area were raised by decreasing
For example, the funds for

outlier compensation could be obtained
designation by
On

a

increased

by decreasing each DRG price

minute amount.

March 24,

Conference Report.

1

983 both

the

House and Senate approved the

The bill was signed into law (Public Law
98-21) by

President Reagan on April

20,

1983, altering the original

reimbursement mechanism for Medicare. 54
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Implementation
The process of

Elementing

P ub l ic

Law 98 - 21 (P L
.

relatively easy.
1

.

98 . 21)>

TUle

The law was concisely
written with regulatory

mil tations

clearly del ineated so
that there were very
few technical
q
the attention of HCFA
staff prior to
implementation
of the law in October
1983.
Julian Pettingil, and
other staff i„ ORD
of HCFA had completed
the necessary wor k
for implementation
before
preparing the Schweiker
Report.
According to one staff
member, this
greatly facilitated
55
implementation.

mng

Summary

The adoption of prospective
payment seems remarkably
swift yet,
in reality, represented
months and years of preliminary
efforts.
The
problem of rising federal health
expenditures had reached monumental

proportions, and the plan had been
developed and tested for more
than
a decade prior to its
incorporation
into legislation.

By the time the

Schweiker Report was submitted
to the appropriate committees,
the

Administration had actively engaged
the key actors involved in the

in

conminicati ng and persuading

adoption process.

Schweiker's

unambiguous advocacy and his creative
leadership produced
swell of endorsement which assured smooth
passage.

the preliminary efforts was the development
of

giving the policy an image of inevitability.

circumstances which served

as

a

a

a ground

The consequence of

momentum of support

Thus,

the

precursor for the placement of

unique
a

well

designed policy on the legislative agenda and the subsequent
effectively executed lobbying strategy

go a long way to providing an

98

adequate explanation ton
legislative adoption of
prospective parent.
The concluding chapter
explores the lessons
to be

case history of policy
enactment for

a

learned from this

broader understanding of
how

policy issues are addressed
at the national level
of government.
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CHAPTER

V

CONCLUSION

On October

1983 the Federal
government implemented a
system of reimbursement
for hospitalizations
under Medicare.
The
system changed the cost
based retrospective
payment mechanism to
Wh,ch prospectively set
the reimbursement
amount according to
1

,

patients diagnostic classification.

The alteration in

new

new
one

the

reimbursed

policy was implemented less
than ten months after
the first public
hearings were held in the
Congress in February 1983
.

The analytic framework
which is most helpful

swift passage of prospective
payment
As detailed

convergence

in

is

in

explaining the

that offered by John Kingdon.

the Introduction, Kingdon

postulates that the

of problem recognition,
policy feasibility, and political

acceptability produces legislative
enactment.

According to Kingdon,

as

1

noted, problems are identified
by

systematic indicators or focusing events
and come to the fore by means
of

a

triggering mechanism or crisis.

this case that signaled

a

The systematic indicators

in

need to control national health
expenditures

were the annually increasing Medicare outlays
coupled with annually

declining federal revenues.

The event which

focused national

awareness on the issue was the 1982 congressional elections

in

which

the economic instability of the nation and the Social
Security system

were highlighted by the candidates.
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Even with an

enhanced national

103

awareness of the impending
problem during the '82
elections, the issue
may not have been
placed on the legislative
agenda without the
existence of a crisis and
subsequent triggering
mechanism.
The crisis which forced
the Congress to address
rising health

care expenditures was the
potential demise of the
entire Social
Security System. The System
was near bankruptcy
in

1982 and the

problem exacerbated when the
Hospital Insurance Trust
Fund defaulted
on a $12 million loan it
had received from Social
Security Trust Fund.
In

1982, faced with

a

need to act. Congress
legislated TEFRfl,

which became the triggering
mechanism for enactment of
prospective

payment.

TEFRA required the Administration
to develop

address the issue of rising
expenditures
hospitalizations.
hospital

Simultaneously, it placed

a

a

for

proposal

to

Medicare

financial burden on the

industry which led them to accept an
alternative reimburse-

ment mechanism in 1983.

Although the problem was becoming obvious
involved

interests, and the attentive public,

to key legislators,

a

solve the crisis had not emerged. The proposal
had

policy that could
to be palatable to

those responsible for its enactment and implementation.
A review of

the Schweiker Report against the backdrop of Kingdon's
deliniation of
the

ingredients of successful

policy further

illuminates why

prospective payment was rapidly enacted because
appears to adhere to Kingdon's guidelines.

The foundation of the

system rested on the operational adequacy of DRGs
incubated

in

its development

,

which had been

academic think tanks prior to their selection by the

Administration

as

the basis of the Schweiker Report.
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Fragmentation within the
policy

detrimental to the

foliation

because direct channeis
of

comity,

which Kingdom cites
as

of a cohesive po,
icy, was minimal

education

among its members
were

assured by the formation
of the Prospective
Payment Task Force.

Fd

lowing the deliberations
of the Task Force
and further consultation
wUhin the Administration,
Richard Schweiker became
the policy

entrepreneur who worked

to insure acceptance
of the proposed
policy.

He was extremely effective
in the position of
policy entrepreneur at
softening up key actors
because he had served as
a Senator (1969-1980)
during Which time he was
heavily involved with the
development of

health policies. Schweiker's
effectiveness as an entrepreneur
was
enhanced further by his firm
belief that prospective
payment could
control rising health costs
without jeopardizing the quality
of care.

Furthermore,

a

prospective payment system based on
DRGs possessed

attributes which would enhance
term,

"the political

its acceptability in,

stream." The primary attribute

to use Kingdom's

in

the prospective

payment proposal was that it promoted
efficient operation of hospitals
by

rewarding hospitals that could provide
care at

the
it

D RG

determined rate.

as they

pleased.

They could

a

cost lower than

keep the difference and allocate

Schweiker pushed this feature when he sought

support for the proposal from the hospital associations.

The

technical feasibility of the prospective payment
plan was assured

through earlier implementation of

a

similar system in New Jersey, an

experience which indicated that prospective pricing of health
care

could contain costs without significantly altering the quality
care.

of

The proposal was also
designed to control only
Medicare hospital
expenditures so as to insure
technical feasibility.
The decision to

target Medicare recipients
was based on the fact
that related costs
could be m °re centrally
and unifor m ,y regulated
than fragmented

programs such as Medicaid.
involvement

The decentralization
of and state

other federally subsidized
health care programs
would
have made implementation
of a comprehensive
prospective payment system
too disjointed and complex
to assure likely
success. Moreover, DRGs
had been designed, tested,
and applied only at/on
in-patient acute
care hospitals costs,
therefore the technical feasibility
of the
in

proposal when applied to other
settings was unknown. Finally,
the
Schweiker policy anticipated future
concerns by providing specific

mechanisms

to deal

with potential implementation
difficulties such as

cost-shifting, skimming, gaming, DRG
creep, diminished quality of
care, and excessive decrease in
the length of hospitalization.
As prospective payment entered

the political

arena, Schweiker

began to choreograph events surrounding
legislative adoption

as

if

following the recipe provided by Kingdon. He
set the stage by

emphasizing the fiscal insolvency

of the

potential for bankrupting Social Security.

Medicare program and

its

The press reinforced

his

position and published articles which predicted the demise
nation's largest social program for the elderly.

of the

Using this base as

a

springboard, Schweiker began to lobby for his prospective payment
plan, which he touted as
financial

a

mechanism that would put Medicare on solid

footing without diminishing benefits.
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The canvassing and
educational efforts
errorts nf
rh
of Schweiker
and his staff
enhanced the genera!
acceptabi,Uy of prospective
<:

e

parent. Through
process. Congressmen
became .one familiar
with the plan and
$Uff

at HHS were a ble to
predict congressional

appropnate responses

concerns and

incorporate

into the document
prior to distribution.

Schweiker was also

a

Rostrated

willing and effective
negotiator as

by his handling of
the early opposition
from the American
Association of Medical Colleges
and the Catholic

Hospital Association

ing

opposition through consensus
building permitted other

influential organized political

interests to gain amentum.

The vocal
support of the two major
hospital associati ons -the
American Hospital
Association (AHA) and the Federation
of American Hospitals
(FAH) --for
the Administration's proposal
led to the emergence
of bandwagoning.
Coupled with the endorsement of
prospective payment by senior
citizen
'

associations, this gave the legislation
perception which

led

to

its

inclusion

an

in

image of inevitability.

A

the 1983 Social Security

Amendments, which insulated the proposal
from any further significant
di stortion.

All

the pieces came together

in

a

manner strikingly similar to

Kingdon's scenario and the Medicare payment
system was changed
fundamentally

in

1983.

This

is

a

rare occurrence.

nature of Kingdon's framework helps to understand

breakthroughs

in

The comprehensive

why substantial

policy take place infrequently. More limited

theoretical constructs, such as David Brown's thesis that there
must
be

a

congruent fit between health policy features and the structure of

political decision-making

in

the United States, are useful

and point
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"

the r,9ht direCti
° n bUt Suffer

th eir

partiaHty

1n focus

What ls evident from
this study is that
the health poiicy
pnocess is
not unique.
The convergence of
positive factors in
m3, which led to
Prospective payment legislation,
are generic to al,
basic changes in

public policy and not
restricted

to

the health

area.
The
differentiating characteristic
of health policies
is that they must be
formulated to reflect unique
aspects of the delivery
system in the
United States, but their
successful adoption reflects
universal

aspects of the political
system

in

the United States.

Thus, Warmer

and Litman's perceptions
of the uniqueness of the
health

environment are, at least tentatively,
called
case study.

As

in

all

policy

into question by the

case analyses, further research
is needed

before firmer judgments can be
confidently made.
The case study also confirms the
predictions of Alford

that hospital
physicians,
to explore

administrators would emerge

as

key actors,

and Starr

challenging

in

the health policy process.

is

whether this eroded the traditional
individualistic

ideology that has marked health policy

in

What would

be fascinating

the United States.

common perspectives of administrators,
private

Will

and public,

the

create a

professional community where corporate concepts
of health care will

find

a

more fertile ground?

acceptable?

Will

state intervention become more

Future developments may hold the promise of comprehensive

rather than piece-meal change.
politics of health policy" is
systematic study.

Regardless of what happens, the
a

field that cries

out

for more
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Epilogue
It

difficult to ascertain the
precise effects of
prospective
payment because of the relatively
short time since
implementation of
the policy.
Host of the analyses admit
to the limitations
in drawing
any decisive conclusions
is

at this

point in time.

A report

in

the New

Eng land

Journal of Medicine by John
Iglehart presents data which
indicates that prospective
payment is an effective
mechanism for

containing Medicare hospitalization
expenditures. According to
Iglehart, the effects of the new
prospective payment system have
been

extensive.

By 1985,

$40 billion,

the reductions in Medicare
expenditures,

about

totaled 12 percent of all federal
budget reductions,

despite the fact that the program
represents only seven percent of
federal outlays.
President Reagan’s
budget proposal

for fiscal

1987

called for additional Medicare reductions
of $5.2 billion.

Despite Medicare expenditure reductions,
hospitals have found
that the economic incentives, as

are an
has

a

component of prospective payment,

effective management tool.

The new prospective payment system

improved clinical data collection and storage,

attention of administrators and physicians

focused the

on resource

consumption,

and enabled many hospitals to realize a profit on Medicare
business.

Since the implementation of prospective payment, the average
length of stay in hospitals

has declined and hospitals

steps to reduce expenses.

There has been

a

the length of stay per admission from 9.9 days

days

in

the third quarter of 1985.

have taken

substantial decrease
in

in

early 1983 to 8.7

Admissions to non-federal

care hospitals have fallen from 9.58 million admissions

in

acute

the first
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quarter of 1983 to
8.59 million by the
third quarter of 1985.3
The
effects of the reduction
in the length of
stay and the decline
in
ssions are reflected in
the occupancy
rates of hospitals
which

fell

from 74 percent
It

in

early 1983 to 63 percent
by mid 1985.''

hard to determine
definitely the finances
of hospitals
under prospective payment
because of conflicting
reports and the
relatively short time period
since
is

the prcgram was

implemented, but
early studies indicate that,
despite the decline in
occupancy, many

hospitals appear to have
prospered under prospective
payment.
According to

a

study conducted by the

inspector general's office
of

the Department of Health and
Human Services, which
examined hospital
cost reports, hospitals had an
average net profit of 14.12
percent

1984.

The importance of this figure

is

realized when it

compared

is

to the prohibition of profits
under cost based reimbursement.

in

5

Other health policy analyses of
the impact of prospective payment

are

less optimistic.

Harvey Sapolsky claims that the policy

reflects the incongruence between the
government's commitment
accessible quality health care and cost
-containmen

the United

States health care delivery system.

t

which threatens

This

in

because the

is

enactment of prospective payment gave the government

advantage

an

economic

the health care delivery system which merely shifted
the

existing burden of rising health costs to other federal

private insurance companies, and consumers.

programs,

Sapolsky predicts that

this shift may lead to the emergence of several unintended impacts.

The

to

placement of increased economic burdens

on

6

inner city

hospitals is one of the potential negative impacts cited by Sapolsky.
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Th.s may occur because
these hospitals lack
sufficient numbers of
privately insured patients
to absorb the losses
sustained when

the governments demands
for price control.
Sapol sky foresees as

a

feting

Another problem that

result of the enactment
of prospective payment

the emergence of chains
of day
surgerv clinic.
a „a „
y iuryery
cnmcs and
emerg 1 center s
which could skim high-price,
low cost, discount seeking
patients from
hospitals. This pattern of
health care delivery could
strip away
is

profitable clients and destroy the
complex web of cross -subs id ies"
that supports teaching and
services for the poor and rare
or expensive
i 1

Inesses.

7

Another dissatisfaction with prospective
payment voiced

by

Sapol sky centers on the methodology
used to determine the price that

the government will pay for any one
treatment.

Because DRGs were

derived from averages-the average cost for
the average patient

in

the

average hospital, they may not adequately reflect
the cost of health
services provided by the facility.

other health policy evaluators.

This issue has been raised by
Based on analysis of variations in

length of stay within DRGs, Berki, Ashcraft, and Newbrander
call

further research into the determination of
price for any given diagnosis.
in

an

for

efficient and equitable

Berki concludes that the

imprecision

the DRG taxonomy introduces biases into the system which must be

eliminated if the system
In

is

to be equitable and efficient.

light of his predictions of negative impacts, Sapol sky's

evaluation of prospective payment not less positive.

Improvement

in

the health care delivery system through the implementation of DRGs

is

unlikely according to his analysis, and he concludes that prospective

Ill

payment will not

1 i

vp

nnP to its
expectations and will
eventually be

considered just another
unsatisfactory reform. 9
A study which
addresses

on hospital

the influence
prospective pay TOnt has had

productivity was done by
Long,

Harmas, Fleming, Kobrenshi,

Ches ney .Amen

t

,

Pes

and Marshall The
research analyze how

hospnal's products and productivity
have been affected
implementation of prospective
payment.

by

the

The results of the research

indicate that prospective
payment precipitated a
slight decrease

patients discharged

to home;

a slight

increase in patients discharged

to short-term hospitals;
a slight increase in
patients discharged

skilled nursing facilities; and
discharged dead.

been

a

change

a

to

slight decrease in patients

Based on the data, the team
concluded that there has
in

the

hospital

product as

implementation of prospective payment.
significant decrease

in

a

result of the

Specifically, there was

a

the number of patients discharged for
whom the

hospital believes the entire episode of
care is complete
to home).

in

Conversely, there was an increase

in

(discharged

the number of patients

discharged for whom further home health care was
required. 10

The policy implications of the study identified by the
research
team speak to the need to determine if decreasing costs

setting
burden.

is

in

acute care

really saving money or merely shifting the financial

Because of the significant increase

in the

number of patients

being discharged prior to the completion of their episode of
other components of the health care delivery system may be

increased expenditures rendering this

a

zero

ill

i

ness

incurring

sum strategy.

A

mechanism that could potentially enhance quality care identified by
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the research is the
improvement

in

discharge planning, which
would

insure the provision of
care to patients until

episode of illness

The

completion of the

11
.

previous

commentaries suggest that though
the federal

government may be able to diminish
its expenditures through
the
implementation of a prospective
reimbursement system, the overall
savings

in

health care costs may be
significantly

less

than

is

indicated by the statistics 12
.

Newcomer, Wood, and Sankar evaluated
the ramifications that
prospective payment has had on the organization
of hospitals,
community agencies, and families of senior
citizens.

According to

them, the management of hospitals has
changed significantly since the

enactment of prospective payment.

Greater economic efficiency has

become the focus of concern for admin

readjustments
productivity.

in

i

s t r a t

o r s

nursing staffing patterns so

Certain economically

caused

and

as to

increase

inefficient services have been

eliminated or marketed to enhance profitability 13
.

Newcomer, Wood, and Sankar report that vertical

services
hospitals.

is

integration of

another impact that prospective payment has had

on

Because of the increased discharges of patients who have

not completed their episode of illness, hospitals are developing their

own home-health agencies

Vertical

and

skilled nursing facilities

integration benefits hospitals because

it enables

(SNF).
them to

shift patients from a high cost to lower cost care setting making

money on both the sending and receiving ends.

If a patient

is

discharged to the institution's SNF, the hospitals are reimbursed the
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amount designated by the
appropriate ORG and the
expense of the SNF
falls on another source
within Medicare, Medicaid,
or the patient's

private insurance.
hospital

Vertical

integration economically
benefits the

and creates a positive
public iroge because it
is a

that enhances the appearance
of improved continuity
of care.

Discharge planning has increased

prospective payment.

Data

in

^chanism
1 ''

response to the passage of

indicate that this

important if patients
are to receive appropriate
care after leaving acute-care
facilities.

The
compl

from

is

incorporation of discharge planning
programs diminishes
l

cations during the recovery
period and protects the hospital

potential liability as the acuity
of patients at discharge

increases 15
.

The passage of prospective payment,
according to the research

team, has several

implications for community agencies.

nursing facilities will be relatively
unaffected

Skilled

by the new policy

because they are unwilling to absorb the patients
who are discharged
early and require extensive care.

These facilities, which are

in

high

demand, tend to admit private paying patients with
limited nursing

care requ i rements.

This places a burden on hospitals to create their

own SNF or contract for a specified number of beds to

insure timely

discharge of patients who have not completed their illness episode.^
Home-care agencies are one community facility for which Newcomer,

Wood, and Sankar predict significant growth.
prospective payment, there has been

number of Med icare-certi

f ied

a

Since the enactment of

significant increase

propriety agencies.

in

the

Institutionally

based agencies comprised the majority of these programs.

The ultimate
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effect of prospective
parent on home-health agencies

is

yet to be

determined, but predictions
include an

increased need for skilled
nursing care, bigber
salaries to attract
skilled pmviders, and
rapid
increases

in

Medicare expenditures for
services. 17

Prospective payment also has
implications for the families
of
Medicare recipients who are
strained when forced to
take on the role
of caregiver.
The impact on the family
faced with early discharge
of
a heavy care patient
is difficult to
estimate, but several studies
report the situation causes
increased anxiety, decreased
work
performance, and worsened financial

status.

Future policies.

Newcomer, Wood, and Sankar claim,
should address these impacts
through
provision of support for families
in these circumstances. 18

They conclude that initial
payment has had

a

research indicates that prospective

generally positive impact on hospitals,
community

agencies, and families but caution that
the ultimate effects are
ambiguous.
Because of the relatively short
period of time since

implementation of the policy authentati ve,
statements about its impact
are inappropr iate.

Another response to prospective payment
Brown who asserts

that

technocratic corporatism

a

is

is

reported by Lawrence

new form of activity identified as
emerging.

Brown relates this development

to three changes caused by the shift of reimbursement from
cost
to price

setting.

The three changes are:

(1)

prospective payment was

the first occasion since the enactment of Medicare that gave

administration

a

fundamental

role in shaping

a

based

program

policy that changed the

program; (2) the change gave Medicare admini strators

a

new instrument
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that could enhance
their rolp

in

+h e
Q ~

refinement, interpretation,
and
application of DRGs; and
(3) the change moved the
United States public

health insurance system
toward

loosely corporate style
of

a

negotiations. 20

The

effect of these three
alterations was to change the

government's role

in

health care delivery
system from one of claims

processing to one of rate setting.

This broadens the purview
of

Medicare administrators beyond
insurance to medical practice.
This
new role requires new skills
a TO ng Medicare administrators,
who must
be able to identify opportunities
for

“gaming” the system, realize the

implications of demographic patterns
on demand for services, interpret
medical diagnoses, monitor quality,
develop

a

severity-of-il lness

index, and analyze every aspect of
the health care delivery system.

According to Brown,

government

a

dm

i

n

i

s t r a t

21

these changes have shifted power to
or

s

.

The

government's ability and

responsibility to direct the health care delivery
system toward the
development of equitable and efficient care

is

thereby enhanced. Brown

states further that the Department of Health and
Human Services should

address the implications prospective payment
of health

care policy.

has

for other aspects

One implication cited by Brown is the shift in

role definition between the federal

and

state goverments.

He predicts

that states will probably adopt an all -payer system to avoid cost-

shifting.

The form that cost -shifting will most likely take

is

movement toward increased expenditures for Medicaid reimbursement

response to

an

the
in

increased need for SNF for patients who are discharged

prior to the completion of their illness episode. 22 Regardless of the
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OUtCOme

°f

eVentS

’

BroW "

«>.t. unde, prospective
payment, the

federal government's
leverage relative to
the states has increased
si gni f i cant ly
and he encourages federal
,
administrators to study the
Situation carefully and grant
waivers to states to
develop

a health
care delivery system that
meets the new demands
created by DRGs. 23
congress is concerned about
the effects of
prospective payment

and has been monitoring
them since implementation of
the system in
October 1983. Hearings were held
before the Senate Special
Committee
on Aging

on September

payment on quality care.

26

.

1985 to discuss the impact of
prospective

In his opening

statement, Senator Charles

Grassley (Republ ican-Iowa) stated the
intent of the hearings:

looking for people who say that the
V- 1,
DRGs were
absolutely the wrong approach and it
ought to be dumped
Now so far I have not heard that too
much.
It is mostly a
case that, yes, we had to do something
in the area of cost
control and the DRGs are a place to start,
but.
And then
from that conjunction "but," there is a
lot of movements in
a lot of different directions of
ideas of how they ought to
y
be changed.
But for instance, I want to hear if there
is anybody who
believes that it was a mistake and we ought to go to
square
one and not start over
or we ought to got to square one and
start over with something else.
,

None of the testimony at the hearings called for the termination
of

prospective payment, but nearly all

speakers indicated the

admission and discharge pattern changes occurring since the enactment
of prospective payment have created

requiring home health care.
home health agencies

and

in

a

new aggregate

population

Speakers requested increased funding for

order to provide care to Medicare recipients

improved hospital discharge planning.

Overall, prospective

117

payment was seen by each snpakpr
y
speaker

.c
as

an

..

effective and important
means

of cost containment. 25

More recently, on April
23, 1986, hearings were
held before the
House Ways and Means Committee
on a bill that would
ensure quality
health care to Medicare
recipients.
cited the negative impacts
of

prospective payment.

appeared to be that there should
care to patients

Throughout the hearings,
speakers

be

The consensus

increased funding for home
health

discharged prior to the completion
of

an

illness

episode, catastrophic health insurance,
and monitoring of the
system
for potential negative impacts. 26

The Senate Finance Committee held
similar hearings to examine the

effect of Medicare's

care.

prospective payment system on the quality
of

Although nearly

increase

in

all

of the

testimony cited

early discharges and called for

a

growth

a

significant

in

home health

care agencies, each admitted that conclusive
data on the impact of
prospective payment are lacking. 27

The potential for

a

recipients according to

decreased quality of health care to Medicare
a

report by the Northwest Oregon Health

Systems has two major policy implications:

an

increase

in

screening of

patients to determine their degree of dependency at discharge;

increase

in

and

an

post -ho spi tal izati on care facilities. 2 ^ Other research

echoes this conclusion.

Clearly, more research is required before all of the effects
prospective payment has had on the nation's health are delineated.

Initial

reports, although not conflicting, provide conflicting

interpretations of the policy's impact on health care.

The program
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appears to be ab,e to
contain the federal

governs

for hospitalization costs
of Medicare recipients.

expenditures

But this does not

address the question of
cost-shifting because the data
examine only
one cost component in

a

complex health care delivery
system.

It may
be that prospective payment
merely shifts costs to other
delivery
centers such as home health
agencies and that net benefits
remain to

be

calculated.

Moreover, it may be that the
resultant focus on

efficient management of health facilities
will have

the quality of health care.

a

negative impact

At this time, more analysis

is

needed

before advocates of a comprehensive
overhaul of the system are likely
to get a serious hearing.
in

This case study reveals that basic
changes

health policy are rare, episodic events
growing out of unique

circumstances.

What is probable

is

that some minor tinkering with the

system will occur as defects are brought to light
over the next
several

years.

Fundamental

reform awaits

a

longer passage of time.
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